Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case
We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority stu...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2016-04, Vol.141, p.95-97 |
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| container_title | Economics letters |
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| creator | Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz Salman, Umutcan |
| description | We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.014 |
| format | Article |
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The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0165-1765</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-7374</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.014</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Affirmative action ; Affirmative actions ; Boston mechanism ; Minority ; Minority students ; Pareto optimum ; School choice ; Studies ; Welfare ; Welfare economics</subject><ispartof>Economics letters, 2016-04, Vol.141, p.95-97</ispartof><rights>2016 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
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| ispartof | Economics letters, 2016-04, Vol.141, p.95-97 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Affirmative action Affirmative actions Boston mechanism Minority Minority students Pareto optimum School choice Studies Welfare Welfare economics |
| title | Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case |
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