Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. This happens because the threat of na...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of industry, competition and trade competition and trade, 2016-03, Vol.16 (1), p.127-136 |
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| container_end_page | 136 |
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| container_title | Journal of industry, competition and trade |
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| creator | Delbono, Flavio Lambertini, Luca |
| description | Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. This happens because the threat of nationalization eliminates the prisoners’ dilemma usually associated with a Cournot game among profit-seekers. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow the policy maker to credibly deter collusion. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10842-015-0211-y |
| format | Article |
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| issn | 1566-1679 1573-7012 |
| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerNature Complete Journals |
| subjects | Collusion Corporate profits Economic Policy Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium European Integration Game theory Industrial Organization International Economics Microeconomics Nationalization Oligopoly Product differentiation Public companies R & D/Technology Policy Studies Threats |
| title | Nationalization as Credible Threat Against Collusion |
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