Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences

We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents' preferences to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modified setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism (e...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American economic journal. Microeconomics 2015-08, Vol.7 (3), p.241-258
1. Verfasser:	Antler, Yair
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Analysis Antlers Athletic drafts & trades Bidding Dominant strategy Equilibrium Game theory Intuition Market mechanisms Matching theory Men Microeconomics Nash equilibrium Space mechanics Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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