Competitive investments in cost reducing process improvement: The role of managerial incentives and spillover learning

We study the rivalry between two firms and consider the effect of spillovers when the firms' operations and technology managers are given bonuses for cost reduction. We model a game in which the firm owners independently offer their manager a bonus to stimulate cost reducing process improvement...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of production economics 2015-12, Vol.170, p.701-709
Hauptverfasser:	Veldman, Jasper, Gaalman, Gerard J.C.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bonuses Capabilities Cost reduction Executive compensation Game theory Managerial incentives Process improvement Production management Spillover learning Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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