Theories and Empirical Proxies for Corporate Tax Avoidance

This study critically reviews the accounting literature of tax avoidance with an emphasis on theories of corporate tax avoidance as well as empirical proxies for tax avoidance. The agency theory should be one of the relevant analytical bases to improve the understanding of the interactions between m...

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Veröffentlicht in:The journal of applied business and economics 2015-09, Vol.17 (3), p.21
Hauptverfasser: Lee, B Brian, Dobiyanski, Alfreda, Minton, Susan
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creator Lee, B Brian
Dobiyanski, Alfreda
Minton, Susan
description This study critically reviews the accounting literature of tax avoidance with an emphasis on theories of corporate tax avoidance as well as empirical proxies for tax avoidance. The agency theory should be one of the relevant analytical bases to improve the understanding of the interactions between managers and shareholders with respect to corporate tax avoidance strategies. A number of empirical proxies for corporate tax avoidance are computed using financial statement variables, but their relevance is limited for firms that engage in conforming tax avoidance that reduce both book and taxable income. Alternatively, tax shelters and uncertain tax benefits can be used as proxies for aggressive tax avoidance.
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identifier ISSN: 1499-691X
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subjects Accounting
Agency theory
Alternatives
Corporate governance
Corporate taxes
Deterrence
Employment contracts
Financial statements
Fines & penalties
Proxies
Stockholders
Studies
Tax avoidance
Tax benefits
Tax evasion
Tax rates
Tax shelters
Taxable income
title Theories and Empirical Proxies for Corporate Tax Avoidance
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