Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases la...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2015-09, Vol.45 (2), p.457-477 |
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| container_title | Social choice and welfare |
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| creator | Lipatov, Vilen Weichenrieder, Alfons |
| description | We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases labor supply of the less productive individuals. When one of the countries has a larger population, this effect is more pronounced in the smaller country. Tax competition generally tends to make societies more libertarian. Particular welfare effects for high and low skilled depend on the form of the government objective function. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Social choice and welfare, 2015-09, Vol.45 (2), p.457-477 |
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| source | SpringerLink Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; JSTOR |
| subjects | Asymmetry Bureaucracy Competition Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game Theory Government Income distribution Income taxes International Political Economy Labor supply Libertarianism Mathematical models Objectivity Occupational mobility Productivity Public Finance Rent-seeking Skilled workers Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy Social research Studies Tax rates Tax revenues Taxation |
| title | Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor |
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