Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Optimally allocating cellphone spectrum, advertisements on the Internet, and landing slots at airports is computationally intractable. When the participants may strategize, not only must the optimizer deal with complex feasibility constraints but also with complex incentive constraints. We give a ve...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2015-07, Vol.92, p.401-429
Hauptverfasser:	Hartline, Jason D., Kleinberg, Robert, Malekian, Azarakhsh
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Advertisements Agency theory Algorithmic mechanism design Allocations Bayesian analysis Bayesian mechanism design Incentive compatibility Multi-dimensional preferences Online advertising Optimization algorithms Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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