The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market
Using a large, unique dataset on the Chinese housing market, we propose to measure corruption using the price differences paid by bureaucrat buyers and non-bureaucrat buyers in the housing market. We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is on average 1.05 percentage points lower tha...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | NBER Working Paper Series 2014-07, p.20317 |
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| creator | Gu, Quanlin Fang, Hanming Zhou, Li-An |
| description | Using a large, unique dataset on the Chinese housing market, we propose to measure corruption using the price differences paid by bureaucrat buyers and non-bureaucrat buyers in the housing market. We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is on average 1.05 percentage points lower than non-bureaucrat buyers, after controlling for a full set of characteristics of buyers, houses and mortgage loans. More interestingly, we find that the bureaucrat price discounts exhibit interesting gradients with respect to their hierarchical ranks, the criticality of their government agencies to real estate developers, and geography. We argue that the bureaucrat price discounts and the gradients of these discounts are unlikely to be driven by alternative explanations, thus they are evidence of corruption and measures of the market value of government power. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3386/w20317 |
| format | Article |
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We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is on average 1.05 percentage points lower than non-bureaucrat buyers, after controlling for a full set of characteristics of buyers, houses and mortgage loans. More interestingly, we find that the bureaucrat price discounts exhibit interesting gradients with respect to their hierarchical ranks, the criticality of their government agencies to real estate developers, and geography. We argue that the bureaucrat price discounts and the gradients of these discounts are unlikely to be driven by alternative explanations, thus they are evidence of corruption and measures of the market value of government power.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0898-2937</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.3386/w20317</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research</publisher><subject>Age ; Bureaucracy ; Bureaucrats ; Corruption ; Economic theory ; Housing ; Housing prices ; Public Economics ; Studies</subject><ispartof>NBER Working Paper Series, 2014-07, p.20317</ispartof><rights>Copyright National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 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| source | National Bureau of Economic Research Publications; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Age Bureaucracy Bureaucrats Corruption Economic theory Housing Housing prices Public Economics Studies |
| title | The Gradients of Power: Evidence from the Chinese Housing Market |
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