Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions
Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in ad...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | NBER Working Paper Series 2013-10, p.19528 |
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| creator | Nowak, Sarah Sood, Neeraj Varadavas, Raffaello Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth |
| description | Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3386/w19528 |
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These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.</abstract><cop>Cambridge, Mass</cop><pub>National Bureau of Economic Research</pub><doi>10.3386/w19528</doi></addata></record> |
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| source | National Bureau of Economic Research Publications; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Decision making Disease Economic models Economic theory Economics of Health Expected utility Immunization Peers Psychological aspects Public health Social networks Studies Subsidies Vaccines |
| title | Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions |
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