Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?

This research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer-owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. Such accounts could he an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without majo...

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Veröffentlicht in:Applied economic perspectives and policy 2014-09, Vol.36 (3), p.527-545
Hauptverfasser: Colson, Gregory, Ramirez, Octavio A., Fu, Shengfei
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creator Colson, Gregory
Ramirez, Octavio A.
Fu, Shengfei
description This research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer-owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. Such accounts could he an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without major government subsidization. Relative to the current program, the proposed design should exhibit minimal moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and since farm-level risk does not have to be priced, the proposed design eliminates the premium rating difficulties that weaken actuarial soundness and trigger the need for substantial external subsidies. In addition, administrative costs should be considerably lower.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete
subjects Agricultural economics
Agricultural policy
Agricultural subsidies
Contribution rates
Crop insurance
Farm economics
farm risk management
farm support programs
Farmers
federal deficit
Insurance premiums
Moral hazard
Revenue
Savings accounts
Studies
Submitted Article
title Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?
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