Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?
This research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer-owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. Such accounts could he an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without majo...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Applied economic perspectives and policy 2014-09, Vol.36 (3), p.527-545 |
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creator | Colson, Gregory Ramirez, Octavio A. Fu, Shengfei |
description | This research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer-owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. Such accounts could he an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without major government subsidization. Relative to the current program, the proposed design should exhibit minimal moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and since farm-level risk does not have to be priced, the proposed design eliminates the premium rating difficulties that weaken actuarial soundness and trigger the need for substantial external subsidies. In addition, administrative costs should be considerably lower. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/aepp/ppu002 |
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Such accounts could he an effective risk management tool for many farmers and could operate without major government subsidization. Relative to the current program, the proposed design should exhibit minimal moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and since farm-level risk does not have to be priced, the proposed design eliminates the premium rating difficulties that weaken actuarial soundness and trigger the need for substantial external subsidies. In addition, administrative costs should be considerably lower.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2040-5790</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2040-5804</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/aepp/ppu002</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cary: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Agricultural economics ; Agricultural policy ; Agricultural subsidies ; Contribution rates ; Crop insurance ; Farm economics ; farm risk management ; farm support programs ; Farmers ; federal deficit ; Insurance premiums ; Moral hazard ; Revenue ; Savings accounts ; Studies ; Submitted Article</subject><ispartof>Applied economic perspectives and policy, 2014-09, Vol.36 (3), p.527-545</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2014</rights><rights>2014 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association</rights><rights>The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. All rights reserved. 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In addition, administrative costs should be considerably lower.</description><subject>Agricultural economics</subject><subject>Agricultural policy</subject><subject>Agricultural subsidies</subject><subject>Contribution rates</subject><subject>Crop insurance</subject><subject>Farm economics</subject><subject>farm risk management</subject><subject>farm support programs</subject><subject>Farmers</subject><subject>federal deficit</subject><subject>Insurance premiums</subject><subject>Moral hazard</subject><subject>Revenue</subject><subject>Savings accounts</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Submitted Article</subject><issn>2040-5790</issn><issn>2040-5804</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kNFLwzAQh4MoOOaefBYCPkrdpWnSxBcpY7rBwILO15BmqXTUtibtZP-9LVXBFw-Ou4fvO44fQpcEbglIOte2aeZN0wGEJ2gSQgQBExCd_uyxhHM0834PfVESRSAmaLVwdYPXle-crozFz_pQVG8eJ8bUXdX6O5zg10JnpcVJ2VpX6bY4WNzW-K94f4HOcl16O_ueU7R9WL4sVsHm6XG9SDaBoTwMA8byndYZyxnXglDJrWEklhmTPOJS73ZG5EQQo_sZQhbJmHMIGSWCZjKTQKfoerzbuPqjs75V-7rr3yq9IlzEEIeE8J66GSnjau-dzVXjinftjoqAGtJSQ1pqTKun45H-LEp7_A9VyTJNh07T7Whejebet7X7NSPKJRNU0C_FuXgy</recordid><startdate>201409</startdate><enddate>201409</enddate><creator>Colson, Gregory</creator><creator>Ramirez, Octavio A.</creator><creator>Fu, Shengfei</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><general>John Wiley & Sons, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201409</creationdate><title>Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?</title><author>Colson, Gregory ; Ramirez, Octavio A. ; Fu, Shengfei</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3622-55fdaab5f56a81396ec5179b596469addc8f181cac8f20b497660253183b9b903</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>Agricultural economics</topic><topic>Agricultural policy</topic><topic>Agricultural subsidies</topic><topic>Contribution rates</topic><topic>Crop insurance</topic><topic>Farm economics</topic><topic>farm risk management</topic><topic>farm support programs</topic><topic>Farmers</topic><topic>federal deficit</topic><topic>Insurance premiums</topic><topic>Moral hazard</topic><topic>Revenue</topic><topic>Savings accounts</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Submitted Article</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Colson, Gregory</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ramirez, Octavio A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fu, Shengfei</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Applied economic perspectives and policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Colson, Gregory</au><au>Ramirez, Octavio A.</au><au>Fu, Shengfei</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?</atitle><jtitle>Applied economic perspectives and policy</jtitle><date>2014-09</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>36</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>527</spage><epage>545</epage><pages>527-545</pages><issn>2040-5790</issn><eissn>2040-5804</eissn><abstract>This research explores the viability of an alternative design for crop insurance based upon farmer-owned savings accounts that are regulated, monitored, and marginally assisted by the government. 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subjects | Agricultural economics Agricultural policy Agricultural subsidies Contribution rates Crop insurance Farm economics farm risk management farm support programs Farmers federal deficit Insurance premiums Moral hazard Revenue Savings accounts Studies Submitted Article |
title | Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance? |
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