SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY

Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of philosophy 2014-09, Vol.111 (9/10), p.454-469
1. Verfasser: JENKINS, C. S. I.
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container_title The Journal of philosophy
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creator JENKINS, C. S. I.
description Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is not to say it is representative of all of them). For that reason, she thinks many of the issues she discusses here are generalizable to other ontological disputes and the case of ordinary objects is a good testing ground for ODS. But she will restrict herself to discussing ordinary objects throughout, both for reasons of space and so that she can build upon important recent work by Amie Thomasson concerning this particular area of ontology.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects A priori knowledge
Analytic Philosophy
Analyticity
Argumentation
Baseball
Contemporary Philosophy
Disputes
Eliminative materialism
Empiricism
Entailment
Existence
Linguistics
Metaphysics
Ontology
Philosophical object
title SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY
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