SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY
Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of philosophy 2014-09, Vol.111 (9/10), p.454-469 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 469 |
---|---|
container_issue | 9/10 |
container_start_page | 454 |
container_title | The Journal of philosophy |
container_volume | 111 |
creator | JENKINS, C. S. I. |
description | Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is not to say it is representative of all of them). For that reason, she thinks many of the issues she discusses here are generalizable to other ontological disputes and the case of ordinary objects is a good testing ground for ODS. But she will restrict herself to discussing ordinary objects throughout, both for reasons of space and so that she can build upon important recent work by Amie Thomasson concerning this particular area of ontology. |
doi_str_mv | 10.5840/jphil20141119/1033 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1682875873</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>43820862</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>43820862</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c369t-bd29c0ec475a9fc7efea2dae48e19cf703010ef8993613082319cbb98c8e58d13</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpVkN1Kw0AQhRdRsFZfQBAC3ho7-5Nk1ytjGzWQNtKkYq-WNN3YhtrEbHrRt3drS8WBYZiZM9_AQegaw73DGfTKerFcEcAMYyx6GCg9QR0sqLC5w8Qp6gAQYlOXfJyjC61LMOGA6KDHJBiH8SSx3oPxkx9ZgzB5m6RB8mDFozSO4pfpnTUMUv-v80cDk340TcN-mE4v0VmRrbS6OtQumjwHaf_VNuqw70d2Tl3R2rM5ETmonHlOJorcU4XKyDxTjCss8sIDChhUwYWgLqbACTXj2UzwnCuHzzHtots9t26q743SrSyrTbM2LyV2OeGewz1qVGSvyptK60YVsm6WX1mzlRjkzin5zym5c8ocxQe0WVW6qhfb49lgqetNq7SM1221qj63cqja7BcidxQJhiMZIY4ngTmmZ64wxJs9sdRt1RxhjHIC3CX0B1VPe7E</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1682875873</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><creator>JENKINS, C. S. I.</creator><creatorcontrib>JENKINS, C. S. I. ; Journal of Philosophy Inc</creatorcontrib><description>Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is not to say it is representative of all of them). For that reason, she thinks many of the issues she discusses here are generalizable to other ontological disputes and the case of ordinary objects is a good testing ground for ODS. But she will restrict herself to discussing ordinary objects throughout, both for reasons of space and so that she can build upon important recent work by Amie Thomasson concerning this particular area of ontology.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-362X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-8549</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.5840/jphil20141119/1033</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: The Journal of Philosophy, Inc</publisher><subject>A priori knowledge ; Analytic Philosophy ; Analyticity ; Argumentation ; Baseball ; Contemporary Philosophy ; Disputes ; Eliminative materialism ; Empiricism ; Entailment ; Existence ; Linguistics ; Metaphysics ; Ontology ; Philosophical object</subject><ispartof>The Journal of philosophy, 2014-09, Vol.111 (9/10), p.454-469</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2014 Journal of Philosophy, Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Journal of Philosophy Sep/Oct 2014</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c369t-bd29c0ec475a9fc7efea2dae48e19cf703010ef8993613082319cbb98c8e58d13</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43820862$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/43820862$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,27901,27902,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>JENKINS, C. S. I.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Journal of Philosophy Inc</creatorcontrib><title>SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY</title><title>The Journal of philosophy</title><description>Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is not to say it is representative of all of them). For that reason, she thinks many of the issues she discusses here are generalizable to other ontological disputes and the case of ordinary objects is a good testing ground for ODS. But she will restrict herself to discussing ordinary objects throughout, both for reasons of space and so that she can build upon important recent work by Amie Thomasson concerning this particular area of ontology.</description><subject>A priori knowledge</subject><subject>Analytic Philosophy</subject><subject>Analyticity</subject><subject>Argumentation</subject><subject>Baseball</subject><subject>Contemporary Philosophy</subject><subject>Disputes</subject><subject>Eliminative materialism</subject><subject>Empiricism</subject><subject>Entailment</subject><subject>Existence</subject><subject>Linguistics</subject><subject>Metaphysics</subject><subject>Ontology</subject><subject>Philosophical object</subject><issn>0022-362X</issn><issn>1939-8549</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2014</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpVkN1Kw0AQhRdRsFZfQBAC3ho7-5Nk1ytjGzWQNtKkYq-WNN3YhtrEbHrRt3drS8WBYZiZM9_AQegaw73DGfTKerFcEcAMYyx6GCg9QR0sqLC5w8Qp6gAQYlOXfJyjC61LMOGA6KDHJBiH8SSx3oPxkx9ZgzB5m6RB8mDFozSO4pfpnTUMUv-v80cDk340TcN-mE4v0VmRrbS6OtQumjwHaf_VNuqw70d2Tl3R2rM5ETmonHlOJorcU4XKyDxTjCss8sIDChhUwYWgLqbACTXj2UzwnCuHzzHtots9t26q743SrSyrTbM2LyV2OeGewz1qVGSvyptK60YVsm6WX1mzlRjkzin5zym5c8ocxQe0WVW6qhfb49lgqetNq7SM1221qj63cqja7BcidxQJhiMZIY4ngTmmZ64wxJs9sdRt1RxhjHIC3CX0B1VPe7E</recordid><startdate>20140901</startdate><enddate>20140901</enddate><creator>JENKINS, C. S. I.</creator><general>The Journal of Philosophy, Inc</general><general>Journal of Philosophy</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20140901</creationdate><title>SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY</title><author>JENKINS, C. S. I.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c369t-bd29c0ec475a9fc7efea2dae48e19cf703010ef8993613082319cbb98c8e58d13</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2014</creationdate><topic>A priori knowledge</topic><topic>Analytic Philosophy</topic><topic>Analyticity</topic><topic>Argumentation</topic><topic>Baseball</topic><topic>Contemporary Philosophy</topic><topic>Disputes</topic><topic>Eliminative materialism</topic><topic>Empiricism</topic><topic>Entailment</topic><topic>Existence</topic><topic>Linguistics</topic><topic>Metaphysics</topic><topic>Ontology</topic><topic>Philosophical object</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>JENKINS, C. S. I.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Journal of Philosophy Inc</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Journal of philosophy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>JENKINS, C. S. I.</au><aucorp>Journal of Philosophy Inc</aucorp><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of philosophy</jtitle><date>2014-09-01</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>111</volume><issue>9/10</issue><spage>454</spage><epage>469</epage><pages>454-469</pages><issn>0022-362X</issn><eissn>1939-8549</eissn><abstract>Jenkins reflects a natural way to give expression to a realist position in matters of ontology. Although ontological disputes are many and varied, she does in fact think the dispute over the existence of ordinary objects is reasonably typical of a fairly wide class of ontological disputes (which is not to say it is representative of all of them). For that reason, she thinks many of the issues she discusses here are generalizable to other ontological disputes and the case of ordinary objects is a good testing ground for ODS. But she will restrict herself to discussing ordinary objects throughout, both for reasons of space and so that she can build upon important recent work by Amie Thomasson concerning this particular area of ontology.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>The Journal of Philosophy, Inc</pub><doi>10.5840/jphil20141119/1033</doi><tpages>16</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0022-362X |
ispartof | The Journal of philosophy, 2014-09, Vol.111 (9/10), p.454-469 |
issn | 0022-362X 1939-8549 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1682875873 |
source | Jstor Complete Legacy |
subjects | A priori knowledge Analytic Philosophy Analyticity Argumentation Baseball Contemporary Philosophy Disputes Eliminative materialism Empiricism Entailment Existence Linguistics Metaphysics Ontology Philosophical object |
title | SERIOUS VERBAL DISPUTES: ONTOLOGY, METAONTOLOGY, AND ANALYTICITY |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-04T19%3A50%3A40IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=SERIOUS%20VERBAL%20DISPUTES:%20ONTOLOGY,%20METAONTOLOGY,%20AND%20ANALYTICITY&rft.jtitle=The%20Journal%20of%20philosophy&rft.au=JENKINS,%20C.%20S.%20I.&rft.aucorp=Journal%20of%20Philosophy%20Inc&rft.date=2014-09-01&rft.volume=111&rft.issue=9/10&rft.spage=454&rft.epage=469&rft.pages=454-469&rft.issn=0022-362X&rft.eissn=1939-8549&rft_id=info:doi/10.5840/jphil20141119/1033&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E43820862%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1682875873&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=43820862&rfr_iscdi=true |