Ex post information rents in sequential screening

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2015-03, Vol.90, p.257-273
Hauptverfasser:	Krähmer, Daniel, Strausz, Roland
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Disclosure Economic models Information disclosure Information rents Sequential screening Studies
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