Ex post information rents in sequential screening
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Games and economic behavior 2015-03, Vol.90, p.257-273 |
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| container_title | Games and economic behavior |
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| creator | Krähmer, Daniel Strausz, Roland |
| description | We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.
•We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models.•Such rents prevent a coordination of lies about ex ante and ex post information.•When the agent's ex ante information is continuous, these rents are zero.•When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are strictly positive. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Games and economic behavior, 2015-03, Vol.90, p.257-273 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Agency theory Disclosure Economic models Information disclosure Information rents Sequential screening Studies |
| title | Ex post information rents in sequential screening |
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