The banking union: flawed by design

The banking union: flawed by design

Banking supervision in the European Union (EU) has traditionally been the prerogative of Member State authorities. The financial crisis that started in 2008 exposed the limitations of this regime. These included, most notably, a tendency of national supervisors to be overly generous towards domestic...

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Veröffentlicht in:Georgetown journal of international law 2014-06, Vol.45 (4), p.1057
1. Verfasser: Dammann, Jens
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Banking
Banking industry
Economic crisis
EU membership
Eurozone
Laws, regulations and rules
Reforms
Regulation of financial institutions
Supervision
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description Banking supervision in the European Union (EU) has traditionally been the prerogative of Member State authorities. The financial crisis that started in 2008 exposed the limitations of this regime. These included, most notably, a tendency of national supervisors to be overly generous towards domestic banks, and the difficulty of supervising transnationally operating banks in an effective manner.
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source PAIS Index; HeinOnline Law Journal Library
subjects Banking
Banking industry
Economic crisis
EU membership
Eurozone
Laws, regulations and rules
Reforms
Regulation of financial institutions
Supervision
title The banking union: flawed by design
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