A Thoreauvian Account of Prudential Value

Henry David Thoreau has not left much of a mark on contemporary analytic philosophy. This is not terribly surprising. We typically prize clarity and argumentative rigor. And though the virtues of Thoreaus writing are many, clarity and rigor are not among them. Indeed, Thoreau seems not only to be aware of this, but to revel in it. At least some of his views admit of clear expression and reasoned support. And at least some of the positions and arguments that can be gleaned from his work can contribute to current philosophical research. Clearly, on Thoreau's view, one cannot understand what is valuable without rejoicing in it. What is perhaps less obvious is that the desirable attitudes to what is valuable will not only involve largely reactive attitudes like being captivated, being exhilarated or being awed, it will also involve active responses. The Thoreauvian has an explanation of why certain kinds of pleasures, knowledge, relationships, achievements, and so on are good for us: they are good for us in virtue of being ways of appropriately responding to something that is valuable.