COMMON-LAW JUDICIAL REASONING AND ANALOGY

COMMON-LAW JUDICIAL REASONING AND ANALOGY

Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a...

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Veröffentlicht in:Legal theory 2014-06, Vol.20 (2), p.133-156
1. Verfasser: Rigoni, Adam
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Bookstores
Bribery
Cognition & reasoning
Common law
Theory
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description Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a feature of judicial common-law reasoning—the practice of distinguishing cases—that rule-based theories ignore. Finally, I show that reason-based, analogical theories of common-law judicial reasoning, such as those offered by John Horty and Grant Lamond, offer especially strong rejoinders to the rule-theorist objections and persuasive accounts of distinguishing.
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source HeinOnline; CUP_剑桥大学出版社现刊
subjects Bookstores
Bribery
Cognition & reasoning
Common law
Theory
title COMMON-LAW JUDICIAL REASONING AND ANALOGY
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