On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism
We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accou...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2014-09, Vol.191 (14), p.3311-3328 |
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| creator | Tucker, Chris |
| description | We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. In Sects. 3–5, I subject reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of evidential support to various counterexamples. In Sect. 6, I show that the most promising ways to address these counterexamples aren't very promising. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11229-014-0446-x |
| format | Article |
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| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Counterexamples Education Epistemology Evidentialism Evidentiality Functionalism Inferential justification Justified beliefs Logic Logical truth Metaphysics Modal realism Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Science Promiscuity Reliabilism Truth |
| title | On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism |
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