The use of village agents in rural credit delivery

Using a simple principal-agent model this article examines the incentive problems that arise when a formal financial institution (such as a rural bank) utilises a member of the rural community to act as an agent in screening potential borrowers and collecting repayment. Optimal compensation schemes...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of development studies 1996-12, Vol.33 (2), p.188-209
1. Verfasser:	Fuentes, Gabriel A.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agents Agricultural policy Bangladesh Bank operations Banking Community Involvement Comparison Credit Financial institutions Foreign Affairs Indonesia Loans Mathematical models Residents Rural areas Rural Communities Rural credit Rural Development Rural economics Rural Government Savings and loan associations Screening Small farmers Villages
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