Approximations to auctions of digital goods with share-averse bidders

We consider the case of a digital product for share-averse bidders, where the product can be sold to multiple buyers who experience some disutility from other firms or consumers owning the same product. We model the problem of selling a digital product to share-averse bidders as an auction and apply...

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Veröffentlicht in:Electronic commerce research and applications 2014-03, Vol.13 (2), p.128-138
Hauptverfasser: Pei, Jinxiang, Klabjan, Diego, Xie, Wei
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container_title Electronic commerce research and applications
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creator Pei, Jinxiang
Klabjan, Diego
Xie, Wei
description We consider the case of a digital product for share-averse bidders, where the product can be sold to multiple buyers who experience some disutility from other firms or consumers owning the same product. We model the problem of selling a digital product to share-averse bidders as an auction and apply a Bayesian optimal mechanism design. We also design constant-approximation algorithms in the prior-free setting including both average- and worst-case analyses.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.elerap.2013.11.001
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source Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Algorithms
Auction
Auctions
Constant-approximation algorithms
Electronic commerce
Prior-free algorithms
Share-averse bidders
Studies
title Approximations to auctions of digital goods with share-averse bidders
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