Turnout and Power Sharing

We compare turnout under proportional power-sharing electoral systems and winner-take-all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voter preferences. If the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all syst...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The Economic journal (London) 2014-02, Vol.124 (574), p.F131-F162
Hauptverfasser:	Herrera, Helios, Morelli, Massimo, Palfrey, Thomas
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Competition Economic models Economic systems Elections Electoral systems Electorate Experiment design FEATURE: POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPERIMENTS Game theory Political parties Political power Political systems Sharing Studies Voter behavior Voter turnout Voting Working papers
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!