Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoC...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2013-12, Vol.25 (4), p.37-40
Hauptverfasser:	Baily, Martin N., Campbell, John Y., Cochrane, John H., Diamond, Douglas W., Duffie, Darrell, French, Kenneth R., Kashyap, Anil K., Mishkin, Frederic S., Rajan, Raghuram, Scharfstein, David S., Shiller, Robert J., Slaughter, Matthew J., Shin, Hyun Song, Stein, Jeremy, Stulz, René M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Capital ratios Capital requirements Convertible bonds Deferred compensation Financial institutions Moral hazard Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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