ZNAM, DAKLE POBJEDNIK SAM: KAKO JE IZRAEL DOBIO SESTODNEVNI RAT?

ZNAM, DAKLE POBJEDNIK SAM: KAKO JE IZRAEL DOBIO SESTODNEVNI RAT?

Using everyday threats coming from its Arab neighbors - Egypt, Jordan and Syria as a pretext, Israel decided in 1967 to launch a preemptive war, which would prevent any kind of threat to its survival. Because the Arab side, led by Egypt's powerful military, had numerical superiority, it was nec...

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Veröffentlicht in:Polemos (Zagreb) 2012-01, Vol.15 (29), p.143
1. Verfasser: Orlovic, David
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Arab Israeli relations
Military engagements
Military history
Military readiness
Military strategy
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description Using everyday threats coming from its Arab neighbors - Egypt, Jordan and Syria as a pretext, Israel decided in 1967 to launch a preemptive war, which would prevent any kind of threat to its survival. Because the Arab side, led by Egypt's powerful military, had numerical superiority, it was necessary to prepare such an act to the minimal detail, and annul their advantage by using advanced knowledge and tactics. On the 5th of June 1967, the plan was put into work through a violent air attack on Arab air forces. Due to lack of air support and the better preparedness of Israeli forces, in six days of war the Arab states lost the entire Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and Golan Heights regions. Israel made itself wide buffer zones, but also new problems that persist to the present day. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; Sociological Abstracts
subjects Arab Israeli relations
Military engagements
Military history
Military readiness
Military strategy
title ZNAM, DAKLE POBJEDNIK SAM: KAKO JE IZRAEL DOBIO SESTODNEVNI RAT?
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