Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem

Some originalists do not see a need to scrutinize the details of the nonoriginalist position that can be taken as implying or suggesting. For according to them, any view of the constitutional law that conceives it as consisting of a plurality of considerations or factors is bound to be unstable or even incomprehensible. A number of constitutional theorists have explicitly articulated this "combinability problem," and the problem resonates with very many constitutional theorists, including even some nonoriginalists. One primary purpose of this Article is to discredit the combinability problem, and thereby facilitate development and eventual acceptance of pluralistic nonoriginalism. The goal throughout this article is not so much to solve the combinability problem, but instead to dissolve it by exposing and making explicit a number of assumptions and predilections among constitutional theorists that are very much dispensable in favor of some more credible alternatives.