God knows (but does God believe?)
The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophical studies 2013-10, Vol.166 (1), p.83-107 |
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| creator | Murray, Dylan Sytsma, Justin Livengood, Jonathan |
| description | The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11098-012-0022-5 |
| format | Article |
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Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0031-8116</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-0883</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0022-5</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Dordrecht: Springer</publisher><subject>Aristotelianism ; Belief & doubt ; Cash registers ; Counterexamples ; Education ; Empiricism ; Entailment ; Epistemology ; Ethics ; God ; Implicature ; Intuition ; Justified beliefs ; Metaphysics ; Philosophical analysis ; Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language ; Philosophy ; Philosophy of Language ; Philosophy of Mind ; Schwitzgebel, Eric ; Sun ; Truth</subject><ispartof>Philosophical studies, 2013-10, Vol.166 (1), p.83-107</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media 2013</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012</rights><rights>2015 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c411t-6bb69333e327f29846859b66223568ed1b36cbd8e006ba6b604b91ddd1bc7b313</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c411t-6bb69333e327f29846859b66223568ed1b36cbd8e006ba6b604b91ddd1bc7b313</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/42920241$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/42920241$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,781,785,804,27929,27930,41493,42562,51324,58022,58255</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=27885931$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Murray, Dylan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sytsma, Justin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Livengood, Jonathan</creatorcontrib><title>God knows (but does God believe?)</title><title>Philosophical studies</title><addtitle>Philos Stud</addtitle><description>The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.</description><subject>Aristotelianism</subject><subject>Belief & doubt</subject><subject>Cash registers</subject><subject>Counterexamples</subject><subject>Education</subject><subject>Empiricism</subject><subject>Entailment</subject><subject>Epistemology</subject><subject>Ethics</subject><subject>God</subject><subject>Implicature</subject><subject>Intuition</subject><subject>Justified beliefs</subject><subject>Metaphysics</subject><subject>Philosophical analysis</subject><subject>Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Philosophy of Language</subject><subject>Philosophy of Mind</subject><subject>Schwitzgebel, Eric</subject><subject>Sun</subject><subject>Truth</subject><issn>0031-8116</issn><issn>1573-0883</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AIMQZ</sourceid><sourceid>AVQMV</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>K50</sourceid><sourceid>M1D</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9UM9LwzAUDqLgnP4BHoSKCHqIvpeXpulJZOgUBl70HJo2lc3ZzqRV_O_N7BiePD14308-xo4RrhAguw6IkGsOKDiAEDzdYSNMM-KgNe2yEQAh14hqnx2EsAAAladyxE6nbZW8Ne1XSC5s3yVV60Ky_lm3nLtPd3N5yPbqYhnc0eaO2cv93fPkgc-epo-T2xkvJWLHlbUqJyJHIqtFrqXSaW6VEoJSpV2FllRpK-1isi2UVSBtjlUVgTKzhDRmZ4PvyrcfvQudWbS9b2KkQUkkSKGEyMKBVfo2BO9qs_Lz98J_GwSzXsIMS5i4hFkvYdKoOd84F6EslrUvmnIetkKR6Vj1t4EYeCFCzavzfxr8Y34yiBaha_3WVIpcgJBIP6gnczE</recordid><startdate>20131001</startdate><enddate>20131001</enddate><creator>Murray, Dylan</creator><creator>Sytsma, Justin</creator><creator>Livengood, Jonathan</creator><general>Springer</general><general>Springer Netherlands</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>IQODW</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>AABKS</scope><scope>ABSDQ</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AIMQZ</scope><scope>AVQMV</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GB0</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K50</scope><scope>LIQON</scope><scope>M1D</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20131001</creationdate><title>God knows (but does God believe?)</title><author>Murray, Dylan ; Sytsma, Justin ; Livengood, Jonathan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c411t-6bb69333e327f29846859b66223568ed1b36cbd8e006ba6b604b91ddd1bc7b313</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Aristotelianism</topic><topic>Belief & doubt</topic><topic>Cash registers</topic><topic>Counterexamples</topic><topic>Education</topic><topic>Empiricism</topic><topic>Entailment</topic><topic>Epistemology</topic><topic>Ethics</topic><topic>God</topic><topic>Implicature</topic><topic>Intuition</topic><topic>Justified beliefs</topic><topic>Metaphysics</topic><topic>Philosophical analysis</topic><topic>Philosophical logics. 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| subjects | Aristotelianism Belief & doubt Cash registers Counterexamples Education Empiricism Entailment Epistemology Ethics God Implicature Intuition Justified beliefs Metaphysics Philosophical analysis Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Schwitzgebel, Eric Sun Truth |
| title | God knows (but does God believe?) |
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