The role of information in contests
Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete informat...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 2013-08, Vol.120 (2), p.160-163 |
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| container_title | Economics letters |
| container_volume | 120 |
| creator | Dubey, Pradeep |
| description | Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.
•The intensity of competition in a contest depends upon information regarding rivals.•Incomplete information creates more competition, if the prize is of high value.•Complete information creates more competition, if the prize is of low value. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1765 |
| ispartof | Economics letters, 2013-08, Vol.120 (2), p.160-163 |
| issn | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1398495754 |
| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Contests Game theory Information Information science Nash equilibrium Prizes Studies |
| title | The role of information in contests |
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