HOLA PREEMPTION AND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF CONGRESS: ARE FEDERAL THRIFTS NECESSARY TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING MARKET?
This article studies legislation, regulations, and case law to analyze whether the Homeowners Loan Act, as well as other measures taken to stabilize federal thrifts in the last forty years, have served their original purpose. It also examines the impact of federal intervention on states and homeowne...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Fordham journal of corporate & financial law 2013-07, Vol.18 (3), p.565 |
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description | This article studies legislation, regulations, and case law to analyze whether the Homeowners Loan Act, as well as other measures taken to stabilize federal thrifts in the last forty years, have served their original purpose. It also examines the impact of federal intervention on states and homeowners and the role that federally-chartered institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations played in the 2008 market collapse. Over the course of this analysis, particular attention is given to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This act has numerous goals including implementing stronger consumer protections, restoring state rights, and preventing another financial crisis, thereby avoiding the need for government funded recovery. It is clear that federal regulators overstepped their bounds in order to preserve federal thrifts, infringed on the rights of states, and limited homeowner access to justice -- all in the name of promoting market stability. The evidence proves that federal intervention worsened the impact of the crisis. This article concludes that federal thrifts no longer serve their original purpose and are no longer economically viable without preferential treatment from the federal government. Since states are in the best position to protect homeowners and institutions do not need an incentive to engage in residential lending, it is in the best interest of all parties to eliminate the federal thrift charter. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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It also examines the impact of federal intervention on states and homeowners and the role that federally-chartered institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations played in the 2008 market collapse. Over the course of this analysis, particular attention is given to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This act has numerous goals including implementing stronger consumer protections, restoring state rights, and preventing another financial crisis, thereby avoiding the need for government funded recovery. It is clear that federal regulators overstepped their bounds in order to preserve federal thrifts, infringed on the rights of states, and limited homeowner access to justice -- all in the name of promoting market stability. The evidence proves that federal intervention worsened the impact of the crisis. This article concludes that federal thrifts no longer serve their original purpose and are no longer economically viable without preferential treatment from the federal government. Since states are in the best position to protect homeowners and institutions do not need an incentive to engage in residential lending, it is in the best interest of all parties to eliminate the federal thrift charter. 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It also examines the impact of federal intervention on states and homeowners and the role that federally-chartered institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations played in the 2008 market collapse. Over the course of this analysis, particular attention is given to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This act has numerous goals including implementing stronger consumer protections, restoring state rights, and preventing another financial crisis, thereby avoiding the need for government funded recovery. It is clear that federal regulators overstepped their bounds in order to preserve federal thrifts, infringed on the rights of states, and limited homeowner access to justice -- all in the name of promoting market stability. The evidence proves that federal intervention worsened the impact of the crisis. This article concludes that federal thrifts no longer serve their original purpose and are no longer economically viable without preferential treatment from the federal government. Since states are in the best position to protect homeowners and institutions do not need an incentive to engage in residential lending, it is in the best interest of all parties to eliminate the federal thrift charter. 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source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals |
subjects | Charters Consumer protection Economic crisis Federal government Financial institutions Foreclosure Homeowners Housing Impact analysis Jurisdiction Loans Mortgages Predatory lending Preemption Reforms Regulation Regulation of financial institutions Savings & loan associations State court decisions State courts Subprime lending Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act 2010-US |
title | HOLA PREEMPTION AND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF CONGRESS: ARE FEDERAL THRIFTS NECESSARY TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING MARKET? |
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