Social Capital and Political Accountability
We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic well-being and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to vote based on criteria of social welfare rather th...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | American economic journal. Economic policy 2013-05, Vol.5 (2), p.222-250 |
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| container_end_page | 250 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
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| container_title | American economic journal. Economic policy |
| container_volume | 5 |
| creator | Nannicini, Tommaso Stella, Andrea Tabellini, Guido Troiano, Ugo |
| description | We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic well-being and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to vote based on criteria of social welfare rather than narrow personal interest. We frame this intuition into a simple model of political agency and take it to the data using information on the criminal prosecutions and absenteeism rates of Italian members of Parliament. Empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of these misbehaviors is considerably larger in districts with higher social capital. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/pol.5.2.222 |
| format | Article |
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Economic policy</title><description>We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic well-being and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to vote based on criteria of social welfare rather than narrow personal interest. We frame this intuition into a simple model of political agency and take it to the data using information on the criminal prosecutions and absenteeism rates of Italian members of Parliament. Empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of these misbehaviors is considerably larger in districts with higher social capital.</description><subject>Absenteeism</subject><subject>Accountability</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Blood & organ donations</subject><subject>Civics</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Economic policy</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Election results</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Incumbency</subject><subject>Incumbents</subject><subject>Investigations</subject><subject>Members of Parliament</subject><subject>Parliaments</subject><subject>Political corruption</subject><subject>Political elections</subject><subject>Politicians</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Reelection</subject><subject>Social capital</subject><subject>Social interaction</subject><subject>State elections</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Voters</subject><subject>Voting</subject><subject>Welfare</subject><issn>1945-7731</issn><issn>1945-774X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNo9kM1LAzEQxYMoWKsnz0LBY9l1J5lsdo9lsSoUFFTwFtJ8wJZ1sybpof-9kUpnDu_N8GMGHiG3UJVAuXiY_FDykpaU0jMygxZ5IQR-nZ88g0tyFeOuqmqWe0aW7173alh0aupTVjWaxZsf-tTrPK209vsxqW2fN4drcuHUEO3Nv87J5_rxo3suNq9PL91qU2jWYCqQCrSqbrSxqExtt5w23AAqu3XCWec0NArRGoGamhoQaputcQIoCFOxObk_3p2C_9nbmOTO78OYX0pgKBhnom0ytTxSOvgYg3VyCv23CgcJlfxLQ-Y0JJdU5jQyfXekdzH5cEKRQdOyXL8411vf</recordid><startdate>20130501</startdate><enddate>20130501</enddate><creator>Nannicini, Tommaso</creator><creator>Stella, Andrea</creator><creator>Tabellini, Guido</creator><creator>Troiano, Ugo</creator><general>American Economic Association</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PYYUZ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130501</creationdate><title>Social Capital and Political Accountability</title><author>Nannicini, Tommaso ; Stella, Andrea ; Tabellini, Guido ; Troiano, Ugo</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c384t-4274ea68cde4ad6eb5285d14aebf7feffc18a44ed74c2d61416e74cdf71217d03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Absenteeism</topic><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Blood & organ donations</topic><topic>Civics</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Economic policy</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Election results</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Incumbency</topic><topic>Incumbents</topic><topic>Investigations</topic><topic>Members of Parliament</topic><topic>Parliaments</topic><topic>Political corruption</topic><topic>Political elections</topic><topic>Politicians</topic><topic>Politics</topic><topic>Reelection</topic><topic>Social capital</topic><topic>Social interaction</topic><topic>State elections</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Voters</topic><topic>Voting</topic><topic>Welfare</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Nannicini, Tommaso</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Stella, Andrea</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tabellini, Guido</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Troiano, Ugo</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>American economic journal. Economic policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Nannicini, Tommaso</au><au>Stella, Andrea</au><au>Tabellini, Guido</au><au>Troiano, Ugo</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Social Capital and Political Accountability</atitle><jtitle>American economic journal. Economic policy</jtitle><date>2013-05-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>5</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>222</spage><epage>250</epage><pages>222-250</pages><issn>1945-7731</issn><eissn>1945-774X</eissn><abstract>We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic well-being and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to vote based on criteria of social welfare rather than narrow personal interest. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1945-7731 |
| ispartof | American economic journal. Economic policy, 2013-05, Vol.5 (2), p.222-250 |
| issn | 1945-7731 1945-774X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1347353798 |
| source | PAIS Index; Jstor Complete Legacy; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Absenteeism Accountability Analysis Blood & organ donations Civics Cooperation Economic policy Economic theory Economics Election results Equilibrium Incumbency Incumbents Investigations Members of Parliament Parliaments Political corruption Political elections Politicians Politics Reelection Social capital Social interaction State elections Studies Voters Voting Welfare |
| title | Social Capital and Political Accountability |
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