Privatizing by merger: The case of an inefficient public leader

We compare a merger between an inefficient public leader and an efficient follower with unilateral privatization of the public leader (both eliminate the inefficiency of the leader). We identify the circumstances in which the merger increases both welfare and private profit and, for the first time,...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International review of economics & finance 2013-06, Vol.27, p.69-79
Hauptverfasser:	Gelves, J. Alejandro, Heywood, John S.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Acquisitions & mergers Merger paradox Privatization Profits Public firm Public policy Stackelberg leader Studies Welfare
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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