The specificity of the generality problem
In "Why the generality problem is everybody's problem," Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory st...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Philosophical studies 2013-04, Vol.163 (3), p.751-762 |
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| creator | Conee, Earl |
| description | In "Why the generality problem is everybody's problem," Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue that the examples that Bishop presents pose no such problem for some theories. I will illustrate the exempt theories by describing how an evidentialist view can account for the justification in the examples without having any similar problem. It will be clear that other views about justification are likewise unaffected by anything like the generality problem. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11098-011-9843-x |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Philosophical studies, 2013-04, Vol.163 (3), p.751-762 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerNature Complete Journals; JSTOR |
| subjects | Beliefs Bona fide purchasers Education Empirical evidence Epistemic justification Epistemology Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge Ethics Evidentialism Justified beliefs Mathematical intervals Metaphysics Myocardial infarction Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Reliabilism Theory Truth United States history |
| title | The specificity of the generality problem |
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