Does St Anselm Beg the Question?

Does St Anselm Beg the Question?

The following objection to the ‘ontological’ argument of St Anselm (Proslogion II) has a continuing importance. The argument begs the question by introducing into the first premise the name ‘God’. In order for something to be truly talked about, to have properties truly attributed to it—it has been...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy (London) 1975-07, Vol.50 (193), p.271-281
1. Verfasser: Devine, Philip E.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Circular logic
Concept of being
Definite descriptions
Existence
Fictitious names
Imaginary objects
Literary characters
Ontological arguments
Paraphrase
Writers
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container_title Philosophy (London)
container_volume 50
creator Devine, Philip E.
description The following objection to the ‘ontological’ argument of St Anselm (Proslogion II) has a continuing importance. The argument begs the question by introducing into the first premise the name ‘God’. In order for something to be truly talked about, to have properties truly attributed to it—it has been said—it must exist; a statement containing a vacuous name must either be false, meaningless, or lacking in truth-value, if it is not a misleading formulation to be explained by paraphrase into other terms. In any case the question of the divine existence is begged.
doi_str_mv 10.1017/S0031819100025110
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identifier ISSN: 0031-8191
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1469-817X
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source Cambridge Journals; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing
subjects Circular logic
Concept of being
Definite descriptions
Existence
Fictitious names
Imaginary objects
Literary characters
Ontological arguments
Paraphrase
Writers
title Does St Anselm Beg the Question?
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