Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations

A problem in the application of formal theories of coalition formation has been whether a conventional rule governs payoff allocations. Specifically, it has been suggested that certain ministerial portfolios are much more desirable than others, and so are allocated in a manner substantially differen...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American journal of political science 1980-11, Vol.24 (4), p.753-768
Hauptverfasser:	Browne, Eric C., Frendreis, John P.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Empirical evidence Estimation methods Financial portfolios Government cabinets Linear regression Overpayment Political parties Return on investment Statistical variance Step functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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