Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information
This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information abou...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Economics letters 1991-01, Vol.37 (3), p.323-329 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 329 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 323 |
| container_title | Economics letters |
| container_volume | 37 |
| creator | Jung, Woon-Oh |
| description | This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income. Investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency's expected revenue. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90230-I |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1292135070</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>016517659190230I</els_id><sourcerecordid>1292135070</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-efb561679a89edd24ea5397030ac872e23aa58d6aa47568445ae513a2d175ab3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1LxDAQhoMouK7-Aw8FL3qo5qNpmosg4seK4GXvYUxnNbJt1ySr7r936opHA-9MCPO-SR7GjgU_F1zUFyRdClPrUyvOLJeKl7MdNhGNUaVRptplk7-RfXaQ0hvnQlqjJ-x2Dl9FxNUQc-hfihfosFj3LUaqHmOG0BeZRpbwmQro2wLSpuswx-CL0C-G2EEOQ3_I9hawTHj026dsfnszv74vH5_uZtdXj6WvapVLXDzrWtTGQmOxbWWFoJU1XHHwjZEoFYBu2hqgMrpuqkoDaqFAtsJoeFZTdrKNXcXhfY0pu7dhHXu60dF_pFCaU9iUVdspH4eUIi7cKoYO4sYJ7kZgbqThRhrOCvcDzM3I9rC1EQ70fx6k5YclZvfhFChDZUMSlqwKwnhGWo1d0k5a95o7CrvchiHR-AgYXfIBCWkbIvrs2iH8_5pvh-mK8A</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1292135070</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals</source><source>Periodicals Index Online</source><creator>Jung, Woon-Oh</creator><creatorcontrib>Jung, Woon-Oh</creatorcontrib><description>This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income. Investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency's expected revenue.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0165-1765</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-7374</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90230-I</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><ispartof>Economics letters, 1991-01, Vol.37 (3), p.323-329</ispartof><rights>1991</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-efb561679a89edd24ea5397030ac872e23aa58d6aa47568445ae513a2d175ab3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-efb561679a89edd24ea5397030ac872e23aa58d6aa47568445ae513a2d175ab3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/016517659190230I$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,3994,27846,27901,27902,65534</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeecolet/v_3a37_3ay_3a1991_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a323-329.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Jung, Woon-Oh</creatorcontrib><title>Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information</title><title>Economics letters</title><description>This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income. Investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency's expected revenue.</description><issn>0165-1765</issn><issn>1873-7374</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1991</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><sourceid>K30</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1LxDAQhoMouK7-Aw8FL3qo5qNpmosg4seK4GXvYUxnNbJt1ySr7r936opHA-9MCPO-SR7GjgU_F1zUFyRdClPrUyvOLJeKl7MdNhGNUaVRptplk7-RfXaQ0hvnQlqjJ-x2Dl9FxNUQc-hfihfosFj3LUaqHmOG0BeZRpbwmQro2wLSpuswx-CL0C-G2EEOQ3_I9hawTHj026dsfnszv74vH5_uZtdXj6WvapVLXDzrWtTGQmOxbWWFoJU1XHHwjZEoFYBu2hqgMrpuqkoDaqFAtsJoeFZTdrKNXcXhfY0pu7dhHXu60dF_pFCaU9iUVdspH4eUIi7cKoYO4sYJ7kZgbqThRhrOCvcDzM3I9rC1EQ70fx6k5YclZvfhFChDZUMSlqwKwnhGWo1d0k5a95o7CrvchiHR-AgYXfIBCWkbIvrs2iH8_5pvh-mK8A</recordid><startdate>19910101</startdate><enddate>19910101</enddate><creator>Jung, Woon-Oh</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>North Holland</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>JQCIK</scope><scope>K30</scope><scope>PAAUG</scope><scope>PAWHS</scope><scope>PAWZZ</scope><scope>PAXOH</scope><scope>PBHAV</scope><scope>PBQSW</scope><scope>PBYQZ</scope><scope>PCIWU</scope><scope>PCMID</scope><scope>PCZJX</scope><scope>PDGRG</scope><scope>PDWWI</scope><scope>PETMR</scope><scope>PFVGT</scope><scope>PGXDX</scope><scope>PIHIL</scope><scope>PISVA</scope><scope>PJCTQ</scope><scope>PJTMS</scope><scope>PLCHJ</scope><scope>PMHAD</scope><scope>PNQDJ</scope><scope>POUND</scope><scope>PPLAD</scope><scope>PQAPC</scope><scope>PQCAN</scope><scope>PQCMW</scope><scope>PQEME</scope><scope>PQHKH</scope><scope>PQMID</scope><scope>PQNCT</scope><scope>PQNET</scope><scope>PQSCT</scope><scope>PQSET</scope><scope>PSVJG</scope><scope>PVMQY</scope><scope>PZGFC</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19910101</creationdate><title>Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information</title><author>Jung, Woon-Oh</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-efb561679a89edd24ea5397030ac872e23aa58d6aa47568445ae513a2d175ab3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1991</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Jung, Woon-Oh</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 33</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - West</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segments 1-50</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - MEA</collection><jtitle>Economics letters</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Jung, Woon-Oh</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information</atitle><jtitle>Economics letters</jtitle><date>1991-01-01</date><risdate>1991</risdate><volume>37</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>323</spage><epage>329</epage><pages>323-329</pages><issn>0165-1765</issn><eissn>1873-7374</eissn><abstract>This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income. Investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency's expected revenue.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/0165-1765(91)90230-I</doi><tpages>7</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1765 |
| ispartof | Economics letters, 1991-01, Vol.37 (3), p.323-329 |
| issn | 0165-1765 1873-7374 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1292135070 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals; Periodicals Index Online |
| title | Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-15T06%3A15%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Tax%20reporting%20game%20under%20uncertain%20tax%20laws%20and%20asymmetric%20information&rft.jtitle=Economics%20letters&rft.au=Jung,%20Woon-Oh&rft.date=1991-01-01&rft.volume=37&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=323&rft.epage=329&rft.pages=323-329&rft.issn=0165-1765&rft.eissn=1873-7374&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90230-I&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1292135070%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1292135070&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=016517659190230I&rfr_iscdi=true |