Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights
This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction, and cooperation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other th...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 1992-09, Vol.82 (4), p.720-739 |
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| creator | Skaperdas, Stergios |
| description | This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction, and cooperation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other things being equal, an agent's power, a well-defined concept in this paper, is inversely related to an agent's resources when resources are valued according to marginal-productivity theory. Some implications for the evolution of property rights are drawn. The model is applicable to a variety of situations in which directly unproductive activities are prevalent. |
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| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 1992-09, Vol.82 (4), p.720-739 |
| issn | 0002-8282 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_1289645862 |
| source | Business Source Complete; Periodicals Index Online; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Economic models Economic theory Marginal products Nash equilibrium Opportunity costs Property rights Return on investment State of nature Total product Warfare |
| title | Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights |
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