Before the Mereological Fallacy: A Rejoinder to Rom Harré

The brain, he claims, is a part of a person's body, 'and a person's body is not part of that person in the relevant sense'.1 Organs of human beings, according to Harré, are tools that a person uses to perform tasks. [...]we presuppose that the normative implications of human psyc...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy (London) 2013-01, Vol.88 (1), p.141-148
1. Verfasser: Hacker, P. M. S.
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description The brain, he claims, is a part of a person's body, 'and a person's body is not part of that person in the relevant sense'.1 Organs of human beings, according to Harré, are tools that a person uses to perform tasks. [...]we presuppose that the normative implications of human psychological predicates can be taken through to the descriptions of lives of animals'. [...]we have the notion of tools and instruments that we make and use to fulfil certain functions. [...]we use instruments, such as spectacles or hearing aids, to improve our perceptual abilities in the case of defects in our sense organs, or to extend our perceptual acuity and range (in the case of microscope or telescope).
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source JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Alliances
Animals
Brain
Consciousness
Divestiture
Hearing aids
Neurosciences
Perception
Philosophy
Sensory systems
title Before the Mereological Fallacy: A Rejoinder to Rom Harré
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