Inducing Agents to Report Hidden Trades: A Theory of an Intermediary

When contracts are unobserved (and nonexclusive), agents can promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that a central mechanism can extract all relevant information about contracts that agents enter by inducing them to report one another. The mechanism sets p...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Review of Finance 2012-10, Vol.16 (4), p.1013-1042
1. Verfasser:	Leitner, Yaron
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Collusion Disclosure Securities trading Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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