Costs of taxation and the size of government
Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary, the par...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 2012-10, Vol.153 (1/2), p.83-115 |
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| creator | Andersen, Jørgen Juel |
| description | Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation. A main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary, the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system. The proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-011-9776-0 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
| subjects | Constitutions Costs Economics Economics and Finance Hypotheses Income taxes Legislators Nash equilibrium Parliamentary system Political economy Political power Political Science Political theory Politics Public Finance Public goods Studies Tax costs Tax evasion Tax incentives Tax rates Tax revenues Taxation Taxes Voters |
| title | Costs of taxation and the size of government |
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