Reduction and emergence

In examining Wiggins’s work it becomes clear that he resists metaphysical biological reductionism – the thesis that organisms are causally, and therefore ontologically, down-stream of the tiny particles that make them up. It is suggested that, in this sense, he might find common cause with the emergentists, like John Dupré. An emergentist reading of Wiggins is assayed, but ultimately rejected. In examining David Wiggins's work it becomes clear that he resists metaphysical biological reductionism, the thesis that organisms are causally, and therefore ontologically, down-stream of the tiny particles that make them up. It is suggested that, in this sense, he might find common cause with the emergentists, like John Dupre. An emergentist reading of Wiggins is assayed, but ultimately rejected. 'Reductionism' refers to not one, but a family of interrelated theses, and like all such 'isms' it is disconcertingly vague, with nigh on as many definitions of the term as tokens of the word. Ingo Bridgandt and Alan Love present a helpful tripartite division between types of reductionism: epistemic, metaphysical and methodological. Metaphysical reductionism focuses on the structure of reality and whether certain biological items do or do not exist. Methodological reductionism relates to scientific practice. The methodological reductionist claims that biological research should work 'from the bottom up'. In examining David Wiggins's work it becomes clear that he resists metaphysical biological reductionism, the thesis that organisms are causally, and therefore ontologically, down-stream of the tiny particles that make them up. It is suggested that, in this sense, he might find common cause with the emergentists, like John Dupre. An emergentist reading of Wiggins is assayed, but ultimately rejected. 'Reductionism' refers to not one, but a family of interrelated theses, and like all such 'isms' it is disconcertingly vague, with nigh on as many definitions of the term as tokens of the word. Ingo Bridgandt and Alan Love present a helpful tripartite division between types of reductionism: epistemic, metaphysical and methodological. Metaphysical reductionism focuses on the structure of reality and whether certain biological items do or do not exist. Methodological reductionism relates to scientific practice. The methodological reductionist claims that biological research should work 'from the bottom up'.