The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments

This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of t...

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Hauptverfasser: Halloran, Matthew A., Walker, James M., Williams, Arlington W.
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description This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.
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source Emerald Books Business Management And Economics
subjects Charities, voluntary services & philanthropy
title The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments
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