Are CEOs Myopic? A Dynamic Model of the Ongoing Debate

Abstract We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon p...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Levesque, Moren, Phan, Phillip, Raymar, Steven, Waisman, Maya
Format:	Buchkapitel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accounting & Finance Corporate finance Corporate governance & responsibilities Management accounting/corporate finance
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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