Government Preference and the Optimal Choice of R&D Subsidy Policy : Innovation Subsidy or Product Subsidy?
Taking government preference into consideration, we consider a three-stage game model to compare the differences of innovation subsidy and product subsidy. The findings reveal that stronger preference to consumers’ welfare leads to higher subsidy rates, which benefit not only consumers but also firm...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of applied mathematics 2014-01, Vol.2014 (2014), p.1-9 |
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| container_title | Journal of applied mathematics |
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| creator | Yang, Yongcong |
| description | Taking government preference into consideration, we consider a three-stage game model to compare the differences of innovation subsidy and product subsidy. The findings reveal that stronger preference to consumers’ welfare leads to higher subsidy rates, which benefit not only consumers but also firms. To choose between the two subsidies, the optimal choice varies with the changing preference of policymakers. According to the results of numerical simulation, product subsidy is better than innovation subsidy in most cases, while the government’s expenditure of the former one is larger than the latter one. Moreover, subsidizing firms symmetrically and asymmetrically has different effects on the consequences. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1155/2014/536370 |
| format | Article |
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The findings reveal that stronger preference to consumers’ welfare leads to higher subsidy rates, which benefit not only consumers but also firms. To choose between the two subsidies, the optimal choice varies with the changing preference of policymakers. According to the results of numerical simulation, product subsidy is better than innovation subsidy in most cases, while the government’s expenditure of the former one is larger than the latter one. 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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</rights><rights>Copyright 2013 Hindawi Publishing Corporation</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-6344ad2f0b61d04ac09f20ce20fa1ecc690e61f5ae94558f113c6cff786ee4f63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c484t-6344ad2f0b61d04ac09f20ce20fa1ecc690e61f5ae94558f113c6cff786ee4f63</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-9991-1693</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,315,781,785,865,878,884,886,27928,27929</link.rule.ids></links><search><contributor>Zhang, Pei-ai</contributor><creatorcontrib>Yang, Yongcong</creatorcontrib><title>Government Preference and the Optimal Choice of R&D Subsidy Policy : Innovation Subsidy or Product Subsidy?</title><title>Journal of applied mathematics</title><description>Taking government preference into consideration, we consider a three-stage game model to compare the differences of innovation subsidy and product subsidy. 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| language | eng |
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| source | DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals; Wiley Online Library Open Access; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Asymmetry Comparative analysis Competition Consumers Economic models Equilibrium Game theory Games Governments Mathematical models Methods Optimization Product innovation Profits Subsidies Subsidies (financial) Utility functions |
| title | Government Preference and the Optimal Choice of R&D Subsidy Policy : Innovation Subsidy or Product Subsidy? |
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