Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China
Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides a...
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| creator | Liang, Peipei Lv, Youqing Zhao, Yajuan |
| description | Enhance performance in manufacturing carbon emission (MCE) reduction has become a widespread consensus and a necessary part, which cannot be achieved without the joint participation of manufacturing enterprises and supervisory departments. Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0299086 |
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Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0299086</identifier><identifier>PMID: 38739883</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Public Library of Science</publisher><subject>Asymmetry ; Behavior ; Biology and Life Sciences ; Carbon ; Carbon emissions ; China ; Climate change ; Coefficients ; Compatibility ; Conflicts of interest ; Criminal liability ; Design ; Emissions ; Emissions (Pollution) ; Emissions control ; Energy efficiency ; Environmental regulations ; Environmental tax ; Funds ; Government ; Government finance ; Incentives ; Literature reviews ; Manufacturing ; Manufacturing industry ; Motivation ; Operations management ; Peers ; People and Places ; Physical Sciences ; Profits ; Public finance ; Social Sciences ; Subsidies ; Supervision</subject><ispartof>PloS one, 2024-05, Vol.19 (5), p.e0299086-e0299086</ispartof><rights>Copyright: © 2024 Liang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2024 Public Library of Science</rights><rights>2024 Liang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>2024 Liang et al 2024 Liang et al</rights><rights>2024 Liang et al. 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Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. 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Accordingly, how to coordinate the interests of both sides and design a reasonable incentive-compatible mechanism becomes an urgent task at present. Considering the two subsidy funding channels of peer funds and government finance, this study applies the evolutionary game model to analyze feasible schemes for designing incentive-compatible mechanism of MCE supervision, discusses and simulates the realistic scenarios and influencing factors of incentive-compatible mechanism under the non-subsidized and subsidized schemes. The results show that MCE supervision is in an incentive-incompatible state under the non-subsidized incentive scheme, while in a constrained incentive-compatible state under the subsidized incentive scheme. With the increase of peer funds and penalty coefficient or the decrease of subsidy coefficient, the period of MCE supervision to reach an incentive-compatible state becomes shorter. However, a lower peer fund and penalty coefficient or a higher subsidy coefficient will contribute to a state of incentive-incompatible or a periodic cycle state of "incentive-compatible → incentive-incompatible →incentive-compatible→…" in the MCE supervision.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Public Library of Science</pub><pmid>38739883</pmid><doi>10.1371/journal.pone.0299086</doi><tpages>e0299086</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0009-0000-6894-1024</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7070-9945</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Asymmetry Behavior Biology and Life Sciences Carbon Carbon emissions China Climate change Coefficients Compatibility Conflicts of interest Criminal liability Design Emissions Emissions (Pollution) Emissions control Energy efficiency Environmental regulations Environmental tax Funds Government Government finance Incentives Literature reviews Manufacturing Manufacturing industry Motivation Operations management Peers People and Places Physical Sciences Profits Public finance Social Sciences Subsidies Supervision |
| title | Incentive-compatible mechanism for manufacturing carbon emission supervision under carbon control policies in China |
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