Do powerful CEOs matter for earnings quality? Evidence from Bangladesh
This study investigates the effects of powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings quality in a setting where CEOs have strong dominance over other top executives and occasionally attempt to exert their influence over corporate regulatory bodies. Using 10-year longitudinal data for the peri...
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| creator | Arif, H M Mustapha, Mohd Zulkhairi Abdul Jalil, Azlina |
| description | This study investigates the effects of powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings quality in a setting where CEOs have strong dominance over other top executives and occasionally attempt to exert their influence over corporate regulatory bodies. Using 10-year longitudinal data for the period from 2010 to 2019 and 1,395 firm-year observations from listed non-financial firms in Bangladesh, we found that CEOs' political power and CEOs with high structural and expert power have a significant detrimental effect on earnings quality. Ownership and prestige power have an insignificant impact on earnings quality. These powerful CEOs use accrual and real activity manipulation techniques together to manage the earnings. This study uses the system-generalized method of moment estimates for estimation purposes, and the results remain robust when alternative earnings quality proxies are used. Taken together, our results suggest that CEOs' political duality (i.e., serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and a CEO) should be restricted and that a CEO's tenure should be limited to a reasonable period. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge by offering empirical support for CEO power dynamics on earnings quality, specifically political and prestige power. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0276935 |
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Evidence from Bangladesh</title><source>Public Library of Science (PLoS) Journals Open Access</source><source>MEDLINE</source><source>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</source><source>Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals</source><source>PubMed Central</source><source>Free Full-Text Journals in Chemistry</source><creator>Arif, H M ; Mustapha, Mohd Zulkhairi ; Abdul Jalil, Azlina</creator><contributor>Gherghina, Stefan Cristian</contributor><creatorcontrib>Arif, H M ; Mustapha, Mohd Zulkhairi ; Abdul Jalil, Azlina ; Gherghina, Stefan Cristian</creatorcontrib><description>This study investigates the effects of powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings quality in a setting where CEOs have strong dominance over other top executives and occasionally attempt to exert their influence over corporate regulatory bodies. Using 10-year longitudinal data for the period from 2010 to 2019 and 1,395 firm-year observations from listed non-financial firms in Bangladesh, we found that CEOs' political power and CEOs with high structural and expert power have a significant detrimental effect on earnings quality. Ownership and prestige power have an insignificant impact on earnings quality. These powerful CEOs use accrual and real activity manipulation techniques together to manage the earnings. This study uses the system-generalized method of moment estimates for estimation purposes, and the results remain robust when alternative earnings quality proxies are used. Taken together, our results suggest that CEOs' political duality (i.e., serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and a CEO) should be restricted and that a CEO's tenure should be limited to a reasonable period. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge by offering empirical support for CEO power dynamics on earnings quality, specifically political and prestige power.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0276935</identifier><identifier>PMID: 36662870</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Public Library of Science</publisher><subject>Analysis ; Bangladesh ; Chief executive officers ; Economic aspects ; Emerging markets ; Generalized method of moments ; Income inequality ; Organizations ; People and Places ; Political power ; Politics ; Profit ; Profits ; Science Policy ; Social Sciences ; Stockholders ; Vaccines ; Wealth</subject><ispartof>PloS one, 2023-01, Vol.18 (1), p.e0276935-e0276935</ispartof><rights>Copyright: © 2023 Arif et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2023 Public Library of Science</rights><rights>2023 Arif et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>2023 Arif et al 2023 Arif et al</rights><rights>2023 Arif et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-94d0bd11f2f8f3de3f67e5cac9fdac90aa5503dbc292273576b353189c62e3013</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-94d0bd11f2f8f3de3f67e5cac9fdac90aa5503dbc292273576b353189c62e3013</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-5013-1047 ; 0000-0003-1397-4122</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9858436/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9858436/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,723,776,780,860,881,2096,2915,23845,27901,27902,53766,53768,79343,79344</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36662870$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Gherghina, Stefan Cristian</contributor><creatorcontrib>Arif, H M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Mustapha, Mohd Zulkhairi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Abdul Jalil, Azlina</creatorcontrib><title>Do powerful CEOs matter for earnings quality? 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Taken together, our results suggest that CEOs' political duality (i.e., serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and a CEO) should be restricted and that a CEO's tenure should be limited to a reasonable period. 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Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Arif, H M</au><au>Mustapha, Mohd Zulkhairi</au><au>Abdul Jalil, Azlina</au><au>Gherghina, Stefan Cristian</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Do powerful CEOs matter for earnings quality? Evidence from Bangladesh</atitle><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><date>2023-01-20</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>18</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>e0276935</spage><epage>e0276935</epage><pages>e0276935-e0276935</pages><issn>1932-6203</issn><eissn>1932-6203</eissn><abstract>This study investigates the effects of powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on earnings quality in a setting where CEOs have strong dominance over other top executives and occasionally attempt to exert their influence over corporate regulatory bodies. Using 10-year longitudinal data for the period from 2010 to 2019 and 1,395 firm-year observations from listed non-financial firms in Bangladesh, we found that CEOs' political power and CEOs with high structural and expert power have a significant detrimental effect on earnings quality. Ownership and prestige power have an insignificant impact on earnings quality. These powerful CEOs use accrual and real activity manipulation techniques together to manage the earnings. This study uses the system-generalized method of moment estimates for estimation purposes, and the results remain robust when alternative earnings quality proxies are used. Taken together, our results suggest that CEOs' political duality (i.e., serving simultaneously as a member of parliament and a CEO) should be restricted and that a CEO's tenure should be limited to a reasonable period. This research adds to the existing body of knowledge by offering empirical support for CEO power dynamics on earnings quality, specifically political and prestige power.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Public Library of Science</pub><pmid>36662870</pmid><doi>10.1371/journal.pone.0276935</doi><tpages>e0276935</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5013-1047</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1397-4122</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Analysis Bangladesh Chief executive officers Economic aspects Emerging markets Generalized method of moments Income inequality Organizations People and Places Political power Politics Profit Profits Science Policy Social Sciences Stockholders Vaccines Wealth |
| title | Do powerful CEOs matter for earnings quality? Evidence from Bangladesh |
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