Smarter than others? Conjectures in lowest unique bid auctions
Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA),...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | PloS one 2015-04, Vol.10 (4), p.e0122923-e0122923 |
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| creator | Zhou, Cancan Dong, Hongguang Hu, Rui Chen, Qinghua |
| description | Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. The kernel of this model is the premise that agents make decisions to achieve maximum profit based on imaginary information or assumptions regarding the behavior of others. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0122923 |
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Conjectures in lowest unique bid auctions</title><source>MEDLINE</source><source>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</source><source>Public Library of Science (PLoS) Journals Open Access</source><source>EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals</source><source>PubMed Central</source><source>Free Full-Text Journals in Chemistry</source><creator>Zhou, Cancan ; Dong, Hongguang ; Hu, Rui ; Chen, Qinghua</creator><contributor>Gao, Zhong-Ke</contributor><creatorcontrib>Zhou, Cancan ; Dong, Hongguang ; Hu, Rui ; Chen, Qinghua ; Gao, Zhong-Ke</creatorcontrib><description>Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. 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This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>2015 Zhou et al 2015 Zhou et al</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-4bee1beca967795944749c7abaeeb681259730a49b9a2a807b3be28d469f39cf3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-4bee1beca967795944749c7abaeeb681259730a49b9a2a807b3be28d469f39cf3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4388543/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4388543/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,725,778,782,862,883,2098,2917,23849,27907,27908,53774,53776,79351,79352</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25849631$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Gao, Zhong-Ke</contributor><creatorcontrib>Zhou, Cancan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dong, Hongguang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hu, Rui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Qinghua</creatorcontrib><title>Smarter than others? 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| subjects | Analysis Auctioning Auctions Behavior Bids Commerce Decision theory Economic models Economics Equilibrium Game theory Humans Models, Theoretical Optimization Physics Prices and rates Probability Studies Systems science |
| title | Smarter than others? Conjectures in lowest unique bid auctions |
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