A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior
The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | PloS one 2014-01, Vol.9 (1), p.e87471-e87471 |
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| description | The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0087471 |
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Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0087471</identifier><identifier>PMID: 24489917</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Public Library of Science</publisher><subject>Altruism ; Analysis ; Automata theory ; Behavior ; Biology ; Cellular automata ; Cluster analysis ; Computer applications ; Computer Science ; Cooperation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Corruption ; Dishonesty ; Empirical analysis ; Evolution ; Game Theory ; Honesty ; Humans ; Learning strategies ; Mathematics ; Medicine ; Probability ; Psychology ; Punishment ; Random variables ; Science ; Social and Behavioral Sciences ; Social aspects ; Social Behavior ; Society ; Statistical analysis</subject><ispartof>PloS one, 2014-01, Vol.9 (1), p.e87471-e87471</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2014 Public Library of Science</rights><rights>2014 Cremene et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>2014 Cremene et al 2014 Cremene et al</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-a274b9677bf7a0c232925194d7f7a2630513f57afbd5ccf841cec3f75afdec3b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-a274b9677bf7a0c232925194d7f7a2630513f57afbd5ccf841cec3f75afdec3b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3904992/pdf/$$EPDF$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3904992/$$EHTML$$P50$$Gpubmedcentral$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,727,780,784,864,885,2102,2928,23866,27924,27925,53791,53793,79600,79601</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24489917$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Perc, Matjaž</contributor><creatorcontrib>Cremene, Marcel</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dumitrescu, D</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cremene, Ligia</creatorcontrib><title>A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior</title><title>PloS one</title><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><description>The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.</description><subject>Altruism</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Automata theory</subject><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Biology</subject><subject>Cellular automata</subject><subject>Cluster analysis</subject><subject>Computer applications</subject><subject>Computer Science</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Cooperative Behavior</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Dishonesty</subject><subject>Empirical analysis</subject><subject>Evolution</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Honesty</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Learning strategies</subject><subject>Mathematics</subject><subject>Medicine</subject><subject>Probability</subject><subject>Psychology</subject><subject>Punishment</subject><subject>Random variables</subject><subject>Science</subject><subject>Social and 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Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Cremene, Marcel</au><au>Dumitrescu, D</au><au>Cremene, Ligia</au><au>Perc, Matjaž</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior</atitle><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><date>2014-01-28</date><risdate>2014</risdate><volume>9</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>e87471</spage><epage>e87471</epage><pages>e87471-e87471</pages><issn>1932-6203</issn><eissn>1932-6203</eissn><abstract>The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Public Library of Science</pub><pmid>24489917</pmid><doi>10.1371/journal.pone.0087471</doi><tpages>e87471</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Altruism Analysis Automata theory Behavior Biology Cellular automata Cluster analysis Computer applications Computer Science Cooperation Cooperative Behavior Corruption Dishonesty Empirical analysis Evolution Game Theory Honesty Humans Learning strategies Mathematics Medicine Probability Psychology Punishment Random variables Science Social and Behavioral Sciences Social aspects Social Behavior Society Statistical analysis |
| title | A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior |
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