Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow
This paper presents a definition of secure information flow. It is not based on noninterference, but on computational indistinguishability of the secret inputs, when the public outputs are observed. This definition allows cryptographic primitives to be handled. This paper also presents a Denning-sty...
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| description | This paper presents a definition of secure information flow. It is not based on noninterference, but on computational indistinguishability of the secret inputs, when the public outputs are observed. This definition allows cryptographic primitives to be handled. This paper also presents a Denning-style information-flow analysis for programs that use encryption as a primitive operation. The proof of the correctness of the analysis is sketched. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/3-540-45309-1_6 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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It is not based on noninterference, but on computational indistinguishability of the secret inputs, when the public outputs are observed. This definition allows cryptographic primitives to be handled. This paper also presents a Denning-style information-flow analysis for programs that use encryption as a primitive operation. The proof of the correctness of the analysis is sketched.</description><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Computer science; control theory; systems</subject><subject>Covert Channel</subject><subject>Cryptographic Primitive</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information systems. Data bases</subject><subject>Language theory and syntactical analysis</subject><subject>Memory organisation. Data processing</subject><subject>Public Output</subject><subject>Secure Information</subject><subject>Security Parameter</subject><subject>Software</subject><subject>Theoretical computing</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>3540418628</isbn><isbn>9783540418627</isbn><isbn>9783540453093</isbn><isbn>3540453091</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2001</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><recordid>eNotkE1LAzEQhuMXWGvPXgOeo0lmN5scS7FaKChUzyGbJmV1d7MkW6T_3rg6l4HnfRmGB6E7Rh8YpdUjkLKgpCiBKsK0OEMLVUnIbEJwjmZMMEYACnWBbqaAScHlJZpRoJyoqoBrtEjpk-YBXiqmZmizc53px8YmbPo9fovhEE2Hl71pT6lJOHi8Ct1wHM3YhAzbE945e4wOb3ofYjdhvG7D9y268qZNbvG_5-hj_fS-eiHb1-fNarklA-dsJNYxTp2rqSicNIoLVlmfH6WKKg-C7ksA66VQsqxpKYFL5S2jVc3BCyMB5uj-7-5gkjWtj6a3TdJDbDoTT7qSpcxe5oj8tVIO-oOLug7hK2lG9a9NDToL0pM6nW3CDyDxYZQ</recordid><startdate>20010101</startdate><enddate>20010101</enddate><creator>Laud, Peeter</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer</general><scope>IQODW</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20010101</creationdate><title>Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow</title><author>Laud, Peeter</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-p221t-ce120eeb064e8a92617cf1860909f360d533cf86985b0583289fc107b23f6a833</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2001</creationdate><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>Computer science; control theory; systems</topic><topic>Covert Channel</topic><topic>Cryptographic Primitive</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information systems. Data bases</topic><topic>Language theory and syntactical analysis</topic><topic>Memory organisation. Data processing</topic><topic>Public Output</topic><topic>Secure Information</topic><topic>Security Parameter</topic><topic>Software</topic><topic>Theoretical computing</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Laud, Peeter</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Laud, Peeter</au><au>Sands, David</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow</atitle><btitle>Lecture notes in computer science</btitle><date>2001-01-01</date><risdate>2001</risdate><spage>77</spage><epage>91</epage><pages>77-91</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>3540418628</isbn><isbn>9783540418627</isbn><eisbn>9783540453093</eisbn><eisbn>3540453091</eisbn><abstract>This paper presents a definition of secure information flow. It is not based on noninterference, but on computational indistinguishability of the secret inputs, when the public outputs are observed. This definition allows cryptographic primitives to be handled. This paper also presents a Denning-style information-flow analysis for programs that use encryption as a primitive operation. The proof of the correctness of the analysis is sketched.</abstract><cop>Berlin, Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/3-540-45309-1_6</doi><tpages>15</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0302-9743 |
| ispartof | Lecture notes in computer science, 2001, p.77-91 |
| issn | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_785878 |
| source | Springer Books |
| subjects | Applied sciences Computer science control theory systems Covert Channel Cryptographic Primitive Exact sciences and technology Information systems. Data bases Language theory and syntactical analysis Memory organisation. Data processing Public Output Secure Information Security Parameter Software Theoretical computing |
| title | Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow |
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