Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1

This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Bleichenbacher, Daniel
Format:	Buchkapitel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Applied sciences chosen ciphertext attack Cryptography Exact sciences and technology Information, signal and communications theory PKCS RSA Signal and communications theory SSL Telecommunications and information theory
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

container_end_page	12
container_issue
container_start_page	1
container_title
container_volume
creator	Bleichenbacher, Daniel
description	This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS #1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attack is SSL V.3.0.
doi_str_mv	10.1007/BFb0055716
format	Book Chapter
fullrecord	<record><control><sourceid>pascalfrancis_sprin</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_2292226</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2292226</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c401t-cc1343922e3e98b4af9e7b5d5f0ea6e53b04ce3e7310ca5d0ee32c657d3251b43</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpFkD9PwzAUxM0_iVK68AkswcASePaznWYsEQVEJRAFqVv04rhtaEki2wP99gQViVtOut_phmPsQsCNAEhv76YlgNapMAfsDLUCM1ZGLg7ZQBghEkSVHf0BNc6kPmYDQJBJlio8ZaMQPqEXSsikGbBFvm6Da7itu7Xz0X1HTjGS3QROK6qbEHnn29jadht4ScFVvG14XDv-Np9w11i_62LdRyFSU5Gv-OtzPueX4pydLGkb3OjPh-xjev-ePyazl4enfDJLrAIRE2sFKsykdOiycalombm01JVegiPjNJagbM9SFGBJV-AcSmt0WqHUolQ4ZFf73Y6Cpe3SU2PrUHS-_iK_K6Tst6Xpa9f7WuhJs3K-KNt2EwoBxe-rxf-r-AM7fGSS</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Index Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>book_chapter</recordtype></control><display><type>book_chapter</type><title>Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1</title><source>Springer Books</source><creator>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</creator><contributor>Krawczyk, Hugo</contributor><creatorcontrib>Bleichenbacher, Daniel ; Krawczyk, Hugo</creatorcontrib><description>This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS #1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attack is SSL V.3.0.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0302-9743</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 3540648925</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9783540648925</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1611-3349</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 354068462X</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9783540684626</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/BFb0055716</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Applied sciences ; chosen ciphertext attack ; Cryptography ; Exact sciences and technology ; Information, signal and communications theory ; PKCS ; RSA ; Signal and communications theory ; SSL ; Telecommunications and information theory</subject><ispartof>Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98, 1998, p.1-12</ispartof><rights>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998</rights><rights>1998 INIST-CNRS</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c401t-cc1343922e3e98b4af9e7b5d5f0ea6e53b04ce3e7310ca5d0ee32c657d3251b43</citedby><relation>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</relation></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BFb0055716$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/BFb0055716$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,779,780,784,789,790,793,27925,38255,41442,42511</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=2292226$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Krawczyk, Hugo</contributor><creatorcontrib>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</creatorcontrib><title>Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1</title><title>Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98</title><description>This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS #1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attack is SSL V.3.0.</description><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>chosen ciphertext attack</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information, signal and communications theory</subject><subject>PKCS</subject><subject>RSA</subject><subject>Signal and communications theory</subject><subject>SSL</subject><subject>Telecommunications and information theory</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>3540648925</isbn><isbn>9783540648925</isbn><isbn>354068462X</isbn><isbn>9783540684626</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book_chapter</rsrctype><creationdate>1998</creationdate><recordtype>book_chapter</recordtype><recordid>eNpFkD9PwzAUxM0_iVK68AkswcASePaznWYsEQVEJRAFqVv04rhtaEki2wP99gQViVtOut_phmPsQsCNAEhv76YlgNapMAfsDLUCM1ZGLg7ZQBghEkSVHf0BNc6kPmYDQJBJlio8ZaMQPqEXSsikGbBFvm6Da7itu7Xz0X1HTjGS3QROK6qbEHnn29jadht4ScFVvG14XDv-Np9w11i_62LdRyFSU5Gv-OtzPueX4pydLGkb3OjPh-xjev-ePyazl4enfDJLrAIRE2sFKsykdOiycalombm01JVegiPjNJagbM9SFGBJV-AcSmt0WqHUolQ4ZFf73Y6Cpe3SU2PrUHS-_iK_K6Tst6Xpa9f7WuhJs3K-KNt2EwoBxe-rxf-r-AM7fGSS</recordid><startdate>19980101</startdate><enddate>19980101</enddate><creator>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer</general><scope>IQODW</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19980101</creationdate><title>Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1</title><author>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c401t-cc1343922e3e98b4af9e7b5d5f0ea6e53b04ce3e7310ca5d0ee32c657d3251b43</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>book_chapters</rsrctype><prefilter>book_chapters</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1998</creationdate><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>chosen ciphertext attack</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information, signal and communications theory</topic><topic>PKCS</topic><topic>RSA</topic><topic>Signal and communications theory</topic><topic>SSL</topic><topic>Telecommunications and information theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bleichenbacher, Daniel</au><au>Krawczyk, Hugo</au><format>book</format><genre>bookitem</genre><ristype>CHAP</ristype><atitle>Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1</atitle><btitle>Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98</btitle><seriestitle>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</seriestitle><date>1998-01-01</date><risdate>1998</risdate><spage>1</spage><epage>12</epage><pages>1-12</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>3540648925</isbn><isbn>9783540648925</isbn><eisbn>354068462X</eisbn><eisbn>9783540684626</eisbn><abstract>This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS #1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attack is SSL V.3.0.</abstract><cop>Berlin, Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/BFb0055716</doi><tpages>12</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext	fulltext
identifier	ISSN: 0302-9743
ispartof	Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98, 1998, p.1-12
issn	0302-9743 1611-3349
language	eng
recordid	cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_2292226
source	Springer Books
subjects	Applied sciences chosen ciphertext attack Cryptography Exact sciences and technology Information, signal and communications theory PKCS RSA Signal and communications theory SSL Telecommunications and information theory
title	Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1
url	https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T20%3A53%3A01IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-pascalfrancis_sprin&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.atitle=Chosen%20ciphertext%20attacks%20against%20protocols%20based%20on%20the%20RSA%20encryption%20standard%20PKCS%20%231&rft.btitle=Advances%20in%20Cryptology%20%E2%80%94%20CRYPTO%20'98&rft.au=Bleichenbacher,%20Daniel&rft.date=1998-01-01&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=12&rft.pages=1-12&rft.issn=0302-9743&rft.eissn=1611-3349&rft.isbn=3540648925&rft.isbn_list=9783540648925&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/BFb0055716&rft_dat=%3Cpascalfrancis_sprin%3E2292226%3C/pascalfrancis_sprin%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft.eisbn=354068462X&rft.eisbn_list=9783540684626&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true