Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices
There has been considerable recent interest in the level of tamper resistance that can be provided by low cost devices such as smart-cards. It is known that such devices can be reverse engineered using chip testing equipment, but a state of the art semiconductor laboratory costs millions of dollars....
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| creator | Anderson, Ross Kuhn, Markus |
| description | There has been considerable recent interest in the level of tamper resistance that can be provided by low cost devices such as smart-cards. It is known that such devices can be reverse engineered using chip testing equipment, but a state of the art semiconductor laboratory costs millions of dollars. In this paper, we describe a number of attacks that can be mounted by opponents with much shallower pockets.
Three of them involve special (but low cost equipment: differential fault analysis, chip rewriting, and memory remanence. There are also attacks based on good old fashioned protocol failure which may not require any special equipment at all. We describe and give examples of each of these. Some of our attacks are significant improvements on the state of the art; others are useful cautionary tales. Together, they show that building tamper resistant devices, and using them effectively, is much harder than it looks. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BFb0028165 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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Three of them involve special (but low cost equipment: differential fault analysis, chip rewriting, and memory remanence. There are also attacks based on good old fashioned protocol failure which may not require any special equipment at all. We describe and give examples of each of these. Some of our attacks are significant improvements on the state of the art; others are useful cautionary tales. Together, they show that building tamper resistant devices, and using them effectively, is much harder than it looks.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0302-9743</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 3540640401</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9783540640400</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1611-3349</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9783540696889</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 3540696881</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/BFb0028165</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Account Number ; Applied sciences ; Automatic Teller Machine ; Block Cipher ; Communication technologies. Networks ; Computer science; control theory; systems ; Exact sciences and technology ; Information and communication sciences ; Information and communication technologies ; Information science. Documentation ; Memory and file management (including protection and security) ; Memory organisation. Data processing ; Resistant Device ; Sciences and techniques of general use ; Security Module ; Software</subject><ispartof>Lecture notes in computer science, 2005, Vol.1361, p.125-136</ispartof><rights>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998</rights><rights>1998 INIST-CNRS</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2395-ab241bf351e1edba812f5d519fd6c999f82f38c293dfadb39a025532c63618013</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BFb0028165$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/BFb0028165$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>310,311,781,782,786,791,792,795,27932,38262,41449,42518</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=2037954$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Roe, Michael</contributor><contributor>Lomas, Mark</contributor><contributor>Christianson, Bruce</contributor><contributor>Crispo, Bruno</contributor><creatorcontrib>Anderson, Ross</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kuhn, Markus</creatorcontrib><title>Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices</title><title>Lecture notes in computer science</title><description>There has been considerable recent interest in the level of tamper resistance that can be provided by low cost devices such as smart-cards. It is known that such devices can be reverse engineered using chip testing equipment, but a state of the art semiconductor laboratory costs millions of dollars. In this paper, we describe a number of attacks that can be mounted by opponents with much shallower pockets.
Three of them involve special (but low cost equipment: differential fault analysis, chip rewriting, and memory remanence. There are also attacks based on good old fashioned protocol failure which may not require any special equipment at all. We describe and give examples of each of these. Some of our attacks are significant improvements on the state of the art; others are useful cautionary tales. Together, they show that building tamper resistant devices, and using them effectively, is much harder than it looks.</description><subject>Account Number</subject><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Automatic Teller Machine</subject><subject>Block Cipher</subject><subject>Communication technologies. Networks</subject><subject>Computer science; control theory; systems</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information and communication sciences</subject><subject>Information and communication technologies</subject><subject>Information science. Documentation</subject><subject>Memory and file management (including protection and security)</subject><subject>Memory organisation. Data processing</subject><subject>Resistant Device</subject><subject>Sciences and techniques of general use</subject><subject>Security Module</subject><subject>Software</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>3540640401</isbn><isbn>9783540640400</isbn><isbn>9783540696889</isbn><isbn>3540696881</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><recordid>eNpFkL1OwzAURs2fRFq68AQZGBgI3OtrO74jVBSQKrHAHDmOjULbpIojEG9PoUhM33COzvAJcY5wjQDlzd2iBpAWjT4QMy4taQWGjbV8KDI0iAWR4iMx-QUKFOCxyIBAFlwqOhWTlN5hlyhZZuJq2X_mvk9j7sbR-VXK-y4f3WYbhnwIqU2j68a8CR-tD-lMnES3TmH2t1Pxurh_mT8Wy-eHp_ntsvCSWBeulgrrSBoDhqZ2FmXUjUaOjfHMHK2MZL1kaqJramIHUmuS3pBBC0hTcbHvbl3ybh0H1_k2Vduh3bjhq5JAJWu10y73WtqR7i0MVd33q1QhVD9PVf9P0Te2qlSO</recordid><startdate>20050615</startdate><enddate>20050615</enddate><creator>Anderson, Ross</creator><creator>Kuhn, Markus</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer-Verlag</general><scope>IQODW</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20050615</creationdate><title>Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices</title><author>Anderson, Ross ; Kuhn, Markus</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2395-ab241bf351e1edba812f5d519fd6c999f82f38c293dfadb39a025532c63618013</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Account Number</topic><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>Automatic Teller Machine</topic><topic>Block Cipher</topic><topic>Communication technologies. Networks</topic><topic>Computer science; control theory; systems</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information and communication sciences</topic><topic>Information and communication technologies</topic><topic>Information science. Documentation</topic><topic>Memory and file management (including protection and security)</topic><topic>Memory organisation. Data processing</topic><topic>Resistant Device</topic><topic>Sciences and techniques of general use</topic><topic>Security Module</topic><topic>Software</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Anderson, Ross</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kuhn, Markus</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Anderson, Ross</au><au>Kuhn, Markus</au><au>Roe, Michael</au><au>Lomas, Mark</au><au>Christianson, Bruce</au><au>Crispo, Bruno</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices</atitle><btitle>Lecture notes in computer science</btitle><date>2005-06-15</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>1361</volume><spage>125</spage><epage>136</epage><pages>125-136</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>3540640401</isbn><isbn>9783540640400</isbn><eisbn>9783540696889</eisbn><eisbn>3540696881</eisbn><abstract>There has been considerable recent interest in the level of tamper resistance that can be provided by low cost devices such as smart-cards. It is known that such devices can be reverse engineered using chip testing equipment, but a state of the art semiconductor laboratory costs millions of dollars. In this paper, we describe a number of attacks that can be mounted by opponents with much shallower pockets.
Three of them involve special (but low cost equipment: differential fault analysis, chip rewriting, and memory remanence. There are also attacks based on good old fashioned protocol failure which may not require any special equipment at all. We describe and give examples of each of these. Some of our attacks are significant improvements on the state of the art; others are useful cautionary tales. Together, they show that building tamper resistant devices, and using them effectively, is much harder than it looks.</abstract><cop>Berlin, Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/BFb0028165</doi><tpages>12</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0302-9743 |
| ispartof | Lecture notes in computer science, 2005, Vol.1361, p.125-136 |
| issn | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_2037954 |
| source | Springer Books |
| subjects | Account Number Applied sciences Automatic Teller Machine Block Cipher Communication technologies. Networks Computer science control theory systems Exact sciences and technology Information and communication sciences Information and communication technologies Information science. Documentation Memory and file management (including protection and security) Memory organisation. Data processing Resistant Device Sciences and techniques of general use Security Module Software |
| title | Low cost attacks on tamper resistant devices |
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