An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the foundation of inter-domain Internet routing. A number of papers have described how BGP is highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [2, 3], and several proposals have been offered to secure BGP [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of these proposed mechanisms rely on...
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| description | The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the foundation of inter-domain Internet routing. A number of papers have described how BGP is highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [2, 3], and several proposals have been offered to secure BGP [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of these proposed mechanisms rely on a PKI, to provide trusted inputs for routing security mechanisms, to enable BGP routers to reject bogus routing advertisements. This paper provides a detailed proposal for a PKI, including a repository system, representing IP address allocation and Autonomous System number assignment,. This infrastructure offers a near term opportunity to improve routing security, since it does not require changes to routers, while also setting the stage for more comprehensive BGP security initiatives in the future. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/11774716_10 |
| format | Conference Proceeding |
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A number of papers have described how BGP is highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [2, 3], and several proposals have been offered to secure BGP [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of these proposed mechanisms rely on a PKI, to provide trusted inputs for routing security mechanisms, to enable BGP routers to reject bogus routing advertisements. This paper provides a detailed proposal for a PKI, including a repository system, representing IP address allocation and Autonomous System number assignment,. This infrastructure offers a near term opportunity to improve routing security, since it does not require changes to routers, while also setting the stage for more comprehensive BGP security initiatives in the future.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0302-9743</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9783540351511</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 3540351515</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1611-3349</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 3540351523</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9783540351528</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/11774716_10</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Address Allocation ; Address Block ; Address Space ; Applied sciences ; Border Gateway Protocol ; Computer science; control theory; systems ; Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface ; Cryptography ; Exact sciences and technology ; Information, signal and communications theory ; Signal and communications theory ; Software ; Telecommunications and information theory ; Validity Interval</subject><ispartof>Lecture notes in computer science, 2006, p.116-129</ispartof><rights>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006</rights><rights>2008 INIST-CNRS</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/11774716_10$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/11774716_10$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,775,776,780,785,786,789,4035,4036,27904,38234,41421,42490</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=19910454$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Atzeni, Andrea S.</contributor><contributor>Lioy, Antonio</contributor><creatorcontrib>Kent, Stephen</creatorcontrib><title>An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing</title><title>Lecture notes in computer science</title><description>The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the foundation of inter-domain Internet routing. A number of papers have described how BGP is highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [2, 3], and several proposals have been offered to secure BGP [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of these proposed mechanisms rely on a PKI, to provide trusted inputs for routing security mechanisms, to enable BGP routers to reject bogus routing advertisements. This paper provides a detailed proposal for a PKI, including a repository system, representing IP address allocation and Autonomous System number assignment,. This infrastructure offers a near term opportunity to improve routing security, since it does not require changes to routers, while also setting the stage for more comprehensive BGP security initiatives in the future.</description><subject>Address Allocation</subject><subject>Address Block</subject><subject>Address Space</subject><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Border Gateway Protocol</subject><subject>Computer science; control theory; systems</subject><subject>Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information, signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Software</subject><subject>Telecommunications and information theory</subject><subject>Validity Interval</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>9783540351511</isbn><isbn>3540351515</isbn><isbn>3540351523</isbn><isbn>9783540351528</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><recordid>eNpNkM1OwzAQhM2fRCg98QK5cOAQ8GbtdX2sqgKVKiFROEe241SF4kR2cuDtSVWQmMtKM6PV6GPsBvg9cK4eAJQSCqgCfsKuUAqOEmSJpywDAigQhT5jU61mfxnAOcs48rLQSuAlm6b0wUchaCLKmJiHfBWaaFIfB9cP0eeboeva2O_CNt94d3BWofcx-D5_bYeDf80uGrNPfvp7J-z9cfm2eC7WL0-rxXxddCXovsC6gbLh1s-8RRClabwtZd0oqrkiINTgNCFZMZNIZLhzCslIZ02tnOU4YbfHv51JzuzHlcHtUtXF3ZeJ3xVoDVxIMfbujr00RmHrY2Xb9jONlKoDtuofNvwB2Z9ZWw</recordid><startdate>2006</startdate><enddate>2006</enddate><creator>Kent, Stephen</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer</general><scope>IQODW</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2006</creationdate><title>An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing</title><author>Kent, Stephen</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-p219t-3df12f0be8eb3142afeb25df76d07616391c9636b485366a0cc736a5cbad7cb03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Address Allocation</topic><topic>Address Block</topic><topic>Address Space</topic><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>Border Gateway Protocol</topic><topic>Computer science; control theory; systems</topic><topic>Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information, signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Software</topic><topic>Telecommunications and information theory</topic><topic>Validity Interval</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kent, Stephen</creatorcontrib><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kent, Stephen</au><au>Atzeni, Andrea S.</au><au>Lioy, Antonio</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing</atitle><btitle>Lecture notes in computer science</btitle><date>2006</date><risdate>2006</risdate><spage>116</spage><epage>129</epage><pages>116-129</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>9783540351511</isbn><isbn>3540351515</isbn><eisbn>3540351523</eisbn><eisbn>9783540351528</eisbn><abstract>The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the foundation of inter-domain Internet routing. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0302-9743 |
| ispartof | Lecture notes in computer science, 2006, p.116-129 |
| issn | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_19910454 |
| source | Springer Books |
| subjects | Address Allocation Address Block Address Space Applied sciences Border Gateway Protocol Computer science control theory systems Computer systems and distributed systems. User interface Cryptography Exact sciences and technology Information, signal and communications theory Signal and communications theory Software Telecommunications and information theory Validity Interval |
| title | An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing |
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