Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption
Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for t...
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| creator | Baek, Joonsang Steinfeld, Ron Zheng, Yuliang |
| description | Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6 |
| format | Book Chapter |
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A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.</description><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Encryption Scheme</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Information, signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Random Oracle</subject><subject>Random Oracle Model</subject><subject>Security Parameter</subject><subject>Signal and communications theory</subject><subject>Symmetric Encryption</subject><subject>Telecommunications and information theory</subject><issn>0302-9743</issn><issn>1611-3349</issn><isbn>9783540431688</isbn><isbn>3540431683</isbn><isbn>3540456643</isbn><isbn>9783540456643</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>book_chapter</rsrctype><creationdate>2002</creationdate><recordtype>book_chapter</recordtype><recordid>eNotUMtOwzAQNE8RSs9cc-Ho4kfseI-oooBUCaTC2XIdp01J42Cnh_497mMuuzszO4dB6JGSCSWkfOZYFAQXQsoCcy0v0D1PxPHmlyijklLMeQFXaAylOmqcSqWuUUY4YRjKgt-iDIQSkhBJ7tA4xg1J4EwAqAxNZj5sTZt_Be_rmNc-5MPa5Qtnd6EZ9rmv80Wz6mzY90Pjuwd0U5s2uvF5jtDP7PV7-o7nn28f05c53jClJLbl0lplBRhbFXUNSlLHgDgrElEzsGAqqaplAUAqbogtjaMSFCSUjjI-Qk-n3N5Ea9o6mM42Ufeh2Zqw17QggoGA5MMnX0xSt3JBL73_jZoSfShQc5060cfC0i6Tn51zg__buThod3iwrhuCae3a9IMLUXNSph6lpkwr4P8Rz2zB</recordid><startdate>2002</startdate><enddate>2002</enddate><creator>Baek, Joonsang</creator><creator>Steinfeld, Ron</creator><creator>Zheng, Yuliang</creator><general>Springer Berlin / Heidelberg</general><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer</general><scope>FFUUA</scope><scope>IQODW</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2002</creationdate><title>Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption</title><author>Baek, Joonsang ; Steinfeld, Ron ; Zheng, Yuliang</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-j2886-c7bcc8c59acd4ff9861e290ec5acdf29c9ad68db4990d3a0c7ae169899997e123</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>book_chapters</rsrctype><prefilter>book_chapters</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2002</creationdate><topic>Applied sciences</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Encryption Scheme</topic><topic>Exact sciences and technology</topic><topic>Information, signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Random Oracle</topic><topic>Random Oracle Model</topic><topic>Security Parameter</topic><topic>Signal and communications theory</topic><topic>Symmetric Encryption</topic><topic>Telecommunications and information theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Baek, Joonsang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Steinfeld, Ron</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zheng, Yuliang</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest Ebook Central - Book Chapters - Demo use only</collection><collection>Pascal-Francis</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Baek, Joonsang</au><au>Steinfeld, Ron</au><au>Zheng, Yuliang</au><au>Naccache, David</au><au>Paillier, Pascal</au><au>Paillier, Pascal</au><au>Naccache, David</au><format>book</format><genre>bookitem</genre><ristype>CHAP</ristype><atitle>Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption</atitle><btitle>Lecture notes in computer science</btitle><seriestitle>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</seriestitle><date>2002</date><risdate>2002</risdate><volume>2274</volume><spage>80</spage><epage>98</epage><pages>80-98</pages><issn>0302-9743</issn><eissn>1611-3349</eissn><isbn>9783540431688</isbn><isbn>3540431683</isbn><eisbn>3540456643</eisbn><eisbn>9783540456643</eisbn><abstract>Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0302-9743 |
| ispartof | Lecture notes in computer science, 2002, Vol.2274, p.80-98 |
| issn | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_14052959 |
| source | Springer Books |
| subjects | Applied sciences Cryptography Encryption Scheme Exact sciences and technology Information, signal and communications theory Random Oracle Random Oracle Model Security Parameter Signal and communications theory Symmetric Encryption Telecommunications and information theory |
| title | Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption |
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