Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
Competitive auctions encourage consumers to bid their utility values while achieving revenue close to that of fixed pricing with perfect market analysis. These auctions were introduced in [6] in the context of selling an unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., rights to watch a movie broa...
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| creator | Goldberg, Andrew V. Hartline, Jason D. |
| description | Competitive auctions encourage consumers to bid their utility values while achieving revenue close to that of fixed pricing with perfect market analysis. These auctions were introduced in [6] in the context of selling an unlimited number of copies of a single item (e.g., rights to watch a movie broadcast). In this paper we study the case of multiple items (e.g., concurrent broadcast of several movies). We show auctions that are competitive for this case. The underlying auction mechanisms are more sophisticated than in the single item case, and require solving an interesting optimization problem. Our results are based on a sampling problem that may have other applications. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/3-540-44676-1_35 |
| format | Book Chapter |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0302-9743 |
| ispartof | Algorithms - ESA 2001, 2001, Vol.2161, p.416-427 |
| issn | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_pascalfrancis_primary_14044190 |
| source | Springer Books |
| subjects | Algorithmics. Computability. Computer arithmetics Applied sciences Assignment Game Auction Mechanism Combinatorial Auction Computer science control theory systems Exact sciences and technology Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Portfolio theory Price Auction Sale Price Theoretical computing |
| title | Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods |
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